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Article 4

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Nebraska Law Review takes pride in presenting the fourth annual Supreme Court Review. This section is devoted to analyses
of recent Nebraska decisions of first impression or landmark rulings
which substantially alter a particular area of case law in Nebraska.
This section is devoted to the practitioner and is intended to provide attorneys with a comprehensive study of selected case holdings
and an analysis of how these decisions relate to previous Nebraska
decisions and the case law of other jurisdictions.
These cases discussed here were decided in the September term
1970, and the January term 1971.
This section does not include those cases which are or may become the subjects of individual casenotes. Thus all recent important
decisions are not contained herein. The Review welcomes suggestions and criticism of the form and content of the section from those
interested in Nebraska law.
Richard E. Kopf
Kenneth L. Noha
Nebraska Editors
The subject areas and decisions discussed in this Nebraska Supreme Court Review are as follows:
I. Constitutional law
A. Constitutionality of non-resident tuition statute****
Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d
840 (1971).
II. Criminal law
A. Coerced consent and standing to challenge search***
State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85 (1971).
B. Photographic identification*
State v. Moss, 187 Neb. 391, 191 N.W.2d 543 (1971).
C. Probable Cause***
State v. Waits, 185 Neb. 780, 178 N.W.2d 774 (1970).
D. Withdrawal of guilty plea****
State v. Johnson, 187 Neb. 26, 187 N.W.2d 99 (1971).
III. Property
A. Restraint on alienation*
Cast v. National Bank of Commerce Trust and Savings
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Association, 185 Neb. 358, 176 N.W.2d 29 (1970), on rehearing, 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).
IV. Secured interests
A. Waiver of security interest"
Garden City Production Credit Association v. Lannan,
186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1970).

V. Torts
A. Strict liability"
Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601
(1971).
*Lawayne Feit '73
**Lloyd Friesen '73
***Gale Pokorny '73
***Thomas Polityka '73
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. CoNsTITuoxNA n

OF NON-RESIDENT TUITION STATUTE

In Thompson v. Board of Regents1 the Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which required four
months continual residence, independent of attendance at any institution of learning within the state, before a person could qualify
as a resident for tuition purposes. 2 Although the residency require1 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).

2 The statutory residency requirements for tuition purposes at issue in
the case were set out in NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (Reissue 1968), which
in part stated:
"A person shall not be deemed to have established a domicile in
this state.. . unless: (1) Such person is of legal age and shall have
actually resided in this state continually for four months with the
intention of making this state his or her permanent residence ....
No such such person shall be deemed to have established a residence in this state during the time of attendance at such state institution as a student, nor while in attendance at any institution
of learning in this state . ..."

It must be noted that this section of the Nebraska Revised Statutes was
amended by the 1971 Nebraska Legislature by L.B. 408 and the new
statutory scheme for determining residency for tuition purposes provides:
"A person shall not be deemed to have established a domicile
in this state, for the purpose of sections 85-501 to 85-504, unless:
(1) Such person is of legal age and shall have established a home
in Nebraska where he is habitually present, with the intention of
making this state his permanent residence;
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ments were changed by the legislature, and in this respect the particular problem presented by the plaintiff is moot, an analysis of
the Thompson case presents an interesting insight into how the
Nebraska Supreme Court may resolve other problems which arise
prior to corrective legislation. In upholding the statute the court
rejected the petitioner's allegations that it violated his constitutional
rights as protected by the privileges and immunities clause of
Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the guarantees of equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
implicit fundamental right of interstate travel. The following analysis of the Thompson case will focus on the court's handling of these
constitutional issues.
The challenge to the former Nebraska statutory scheme for tuition residency requirements arose under the following circumstances. On September 5, 1967 the plaintiff, Raymond S. Thompson
III, moved to Nebraska with his wife and two children with the
intention of making Nebraska his fixed and permanent residence.
Shortly after his arrival the plaintiff enrolled in the law school at
the University of Nebraska and began his studies there. However,
he was charged the higher nonresident tuition rate during the three
years and the summer session he attended the law school. After
graduation he brought this suit against the Board of Regents alleg(2) The parents, parent, or guardian having custody of a minor
registering in a state educational institution shall have established
a home in Nebraska where such parents, parent, or guardian is
habitually present with the intention of such parents, parent, or
guardian to make this state their, his, or her permanent residence;
Provided, that if a person has matriculated in a state educational
institution while his parents had an established domicle in this
state, and the parents leave the state, such person shall not lose
his domiciliary status by reason of such parents, parent, or guardian
having ceased to reside in this state if such person has the intention
to make this state his permanent residence;
(3) An emancipated minor, who shall have established a home in
Nebraska where he is habitually present with the intention of mak-

ing this state his permanent residence, and shall not have lived

with nor been supported by his parents, or either of them, for two
years or more prior to such registration;
(4) Such person is a nonresident of this state prior to marriage, and
marries a person who has established a home in Nebraska where he
is habitually present with the intention of making this state his
permanent residence;
(5) Such person, if an alien, shall have begun processing his United
State naturalization papers, and shall have established a home in
Nebraska where he is habitually present with the intention to make
this state his permanent residence;
(6) Such person is a dependent of a staff member of the Univer-

sity of Nebraska or one of the Nebraska state colleges who joins
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big that he was damaged in the amount of 1,624.50 dollars 3 since he
was charged the nonresident tuition rate rather than the lower resident rate. In support of this contention Thompson offered a substantial amount of uncontradicted evidence to show that he was, in fact, a
resident rather than a nonresident and, therefore, entitled to the
lower tuition rate. The uncontested facts included the following:
Thompson had actually resided in Nebraska since September 5, 1967.
Shortly after his arrival he and his wife purchased a home in
Lincoln and paid property tax on that home. Thompson paid state
sales and income taxes as well as Nebraska motor vehicle taxes.
Thompson and his wife were registered to vote and did vote in
the staff immediately prior to the beginning of a term from an
out-of-state location; or
(7) Such person is on active duty with the armed services of the
United States and has been assigned a permanent duty station in
Nebraska, or is a legal dependent of a person on active duty with
the armed services of the United States assigned a permanent duty
station in Nebraska." NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (Reissue 1971).
"No person shall be deemed to have established a home in Nebraska where he is habitually present unless he shall execute an
affidavit of intent that the State of Nebraska is his permanent residence and has been his permanent residence for one year immediately prior to the execution of the affidavit of intent, and he shall:
(1) Have been registered to and be eligible for voting in Nebraska
state elections;
(2) Have continually for one year immediately prior to the beginning of the semester or summer session for which the student
is enrolling:
(a) Paid applicable Nebraska sales and Nebraska income tax
as a Nebraska resident; and
(b) Registered and had assessed for appliable taxation in Nebraska, all personal property requiring registration, as may
be owned by such person; or
(3) Own a home in Nebraska in which such person is residing, or
have executed a contract to purchase and be making payments on
a home in Nebraska in which such person is residing." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 85-502.01 (Reissue 1971).
"The provisions of sections 85-502 to 85-502.02 shall apply to
enrollment of students after August 31, 1972." NEB.

REV. STAT.

§ 85-502.02 (Reissue 1971).
Although the amendments made several changes in the statute under
which Thompson brought his suit, the basic change was the substitution of the four month continual residence apart from attendance at
an institution of learning with a straight residency requirement of
one year for a person of legal age with the intent to make Nebraska
his permanent residence.
3 Brief for Appellee at 7, Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252,
188 N.W.2d 840 (1971). This figure was arrived at by taking the differences between the nonresident tuition rate and the resident tuition
for six semesters and the summer session that Thompson attended the
law school.
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Nebraska and nowhere else. Thompson had no residence or home
in any other state and was not allowed resident tuition rates in any
other state. In 1968 he was a qualified delegate to the Lancaster
County Democratic Convention and was an alternate to the State
Democratic Convention. In addition, he was appointed by the County
Judge of the County of Lancaster, State of Nebraska, to act and
serve as guardian for minor children in that county. Also he had
4
employment in Nebraska and nowhere else since September 1967.
The trial court entered judgment determining the statute5 to be
valid and constitutional to the extent that it provided for an initial
four-month waiting period before residency for tuition could be
established. The court further found that the last sentence of the
statute, which specified that no one could establish a residence
for tuition purposes while a student at any institution of learning
in the state, was unconstitutional and invalid and was also severable
from the rest of the statute. As a result, the court awarded Thompson 1,375.50 dollars, plus the costs of the action. 6 The Board of Regents appealed and the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding
the entire statute constitutional.
In order to fully understand the decision in Thompson one must
understand not only what was at issue in the case but also what
arguably was not at issue. The parties were in agreement that a
state may constitutionally charge a higher tuition rate to a nonresident than to a resident. In addition, the parties agreed that a state
may also constitutionally impose an original durational residency
requirement for a nonresident to qualify as a resident for tuition
purposes.7 Consequently, these two issues, which centered on the
words "nonresident" and "original" durational residency requirement, ostensibly were not at issue in the case. In contrast, the appellee contended he was a resident of the State of Nebraska and he
argued that the State of Nebraska was arbitrarily discriminating between its own citizens by charging a higher tuition rate to those
"residents" who had not met the statutory requirements of tuition
residency compared to those "residents" who had met the requirements.8 Moreover, he contended that the requirement of four months
Brief for Appellee at 4-6, Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252,
188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (Reissue 1968). See note 2, supra.
6 The judgment for $1,374.50 amounted to the difference in resident and
4

nonresident tuition for the term of enrollment except for the first
semester thereof.
7 187 Neb. at 254, 188 N.W.2d at 842.
8 Brief for Appellee at 10, Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb.
252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
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continual residency independent of attendance at an institution of
learning created an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption that
he was a nonresident for tuition purposes. Thus, Thompson con-

tended that the irrebuttable presumption denied him the opportunity to prove his actual residency and the statutory scheme with its
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency was a denial of equal protection. In addition, he argued that the statutory scheme was a
denial of fundamental rights guaranteed to him by the United
States Constitution and that the burden was on the State of Nebraska to show a compelling interest in this statutory scheme.
Thompson based his claim on three constitutional grounds: the
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
equal protection, and the synthesis of constitutional guarantees producing the fundamental right to travel.9
The first problem to which the court addressed itself was to ascertain the proper standard to be applied with regard to the attack
on the statute. Relying on Starns v. Malkerson ° the court decided

9 Id. at 17.
10 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aifd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).

According to the court in Starns the one year residency requirement in
Minnesota was not an infringement of the fundamental right to interstate travel recently announced by the Supreme Court in Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Minnesota federal district court
felt that the welfare situation in Shapiro could be distinguished on
two grounds. First, there were no facts which showed that the one year
waiting period for resident tuition purposes had a specific objective
of excluding or even deterring out-of-state students from attending
state universities since statistics showed some 6,000 nonresident students at Minnesota state universities. Hence, the court found that there
was no chilling effect on the right to travel. Second, in the tuition
situation there was no problem with the denial of basic necessities
of life to needy persons as there was in the welfare situation in
Shapiro. But cf. Comment, Residence Requirements After Shapiro v.
Thompson, 70 Conmm. L. REv. 134, 152-53 (1970), where the author
states:
"For a person of limited income, the difference in tuition at the
university of a neighboring state will often be enough to dissuade
him from attending. The New York Times has reported that: '[i]ncreasingly, universities in the Middle West and elsewhere are taking direct or indirect steps to limit the number of enrollees from
outside their state borders.' Among the measures taken according
to the Times, is increasing nonresident tuition. The chilling effect
of higher tuition is, therefore, recognized by university administrators and state legislators ....
"

In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1961), the issue was whether a student is entitled to procedural due
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that the plaintiff had not alleged any impairment or denial of a
fundamental right. Consequently, the proper test to be applied was
the traditional equal protection test of whether there was a reasonable basis for the classifications. By holding that Thompson did not
claim infringement of a fundamental constitutional right, the court,
in effect, held that interstate travel is not by itself a fundamental
constitutional right. With respect to the leading case on the right to
interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson,'1 the court observed: "The
limit of its reach illuminates the path of of our decision.1 12 It should
be noted that in striking down a statute which required one year's
residency before a person could receive welfare payments, the Court
in Shapiro specifically left open the question of the constitutionality
of residency requirements for lower tuition rates. In an oft-quoted
footnote, the Court in Shapiro stated:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuitionfree education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt
or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling
state interests on the one hand or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel.13
process when university officials attempted to expel him for alleged
misconduct. In ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to notice and
an opportunity for a hearing, the court made the following observation
about the importance of education:
"It requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital
and, indeed, basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education
the plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to
enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the
duties and responsibilities of good citizens." Id. at 157.
In addition, a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), cast considerable doubt on the
continuing validity of the requirement that the purpose of the challenged statute be to deter travel. The court held that the durational
residence requirement of one year before a resident could vote in
Tennessee was an unconstitutional infringement on the right to vote
and on the right to travel. Referring to the Shapiro case, the Court
noted: "Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare
actually deterred travel. Nor have other 'right to travel' cases in this
Court always relied on the presence of actual deterence." Id. at 339-40.
11 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
12 187 Neb. at 254, 188 N.W.2d at 842.
13 394 U.S. at 638 n.21. This footnote from Shapiro has served as a
springboard for a number of commentators who have attempted to
ascertain the impact of the Shapiro decision. For a general discussion
of the problems presented by the footnote see Comment, Residence
Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 CoLnm. LAW REv. 134
(1970). For a particular discussion of the problems relating to residence requirements for tuition see Clarke, Validity of Discriminatory

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Consequently, according to the court in Thompson it appears
that whether a person's right to travel is classified as a fundamental
right depends on the person's reason for travel, on the penalties or
obstacles that a state imposes upon the person as a result of his
travels, and the specific objective of the challenged statute in creating obstacles to the right to travel. In other words, the right to
travel is a fundamental right only when there is a statute whose
specific objective is to discourage interstate travel and when the4
traveler is somehow penalized or denied a basic necessity of life.
Having decided that the reasonable basis test was the proper
standard to be applied, the court found a reasonable basis for the
statute. The court said:
In classifying students for the purpose of charging tuition, the
state had a legitimate objective of attempting to achieve a partial
cost equalization between those persons who have, and those who
Nonresident Tuition Charges in Public Higher Education Under the
Interstate Privileges and Immuity Clause, 50 NEB. L. REv. 31 (1970);

14

Comment, Nonresident Tuition Charged By State Universities in Review, 38 U.M.K.C.L. Rnv. 341 (1970); Comment, Residency, Tuition
and the Twelve-Month Dilemma, 7 Hous. L. Rxv. 241 (1969). Note,
The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition, 55 iVInN. L. REv. 1139
(1971).
However, whether this is still the state of the law in light of Dunn
v.Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), is open to question. There is language
in the case which would imply that in order for any durational residence law, or any classification based on recent interstate travel, to be
upheld the state would have to show a substantial and compelling
reason for the statute. In striking down the one year residence requirement before a resident could vote, the Court stated:
"In the present case, whether we look at the benefit withheld by
the classification (the opportunity to vote) or the basis for the classification (recent interstate travel) we conclude that the State must
show a substantial and compelling reason for imposing durational
residence requirements." Id. at 335.
However, the court noted in a footnote that:
"States may show an overriding interest in imposing an appropriate bona fide residence requirement on would-be-voters. One who
travels out of a State may no longer be a bona fide resident, and
may not be allowed to vote in the old State. Similarly one who
travels to a new State may, in some cases, not establish bona fide
residence and may be ineligible to vote in the new State. Nothing
said today is meant to cast doubt on the validity of appropriately
defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements."
Id. at 342 n.13.
The exact extent of the language in the case is as yet undetermined
and has to be read in the context of the particular holding in the
case. The Court held unconstitutional a residence requirement of one
year in the state and three months in the county before a resident
could vote.
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have not, recently contributed to the state's economy through
employment, tax payment, and expenditures within the state.15

The language used by the court does state a reasonable legislative
purpose, i.e., to equalize costs. Applying the court's test, however,
Thompson's evidence strongly suggests that he was, in fact, one of
"those persons who [had] . . .recently contributed to the state's
economy through employment, tax payments and expenditures
within the state."' 16
The court also correctly stated that the basic requirement for
establishing any sort of residency was the individual's bona fide
intention to remain in the state even after finishing his education.
In attempting to ascertain the individual's bona fide intention to
establish residency in Nebraska, the court looked for an objective
test and promulgated the following formula:
Voting, physical presence, acquisition of housing, or payment of
taxes may or may not be indicative of the establishment of a legal
residence, which is primarily a question of intent. The acquisition
of these various indicia, coupled with an actual residence requirement of 4 months while not attending school,
obviously comes much
closer to proving the bona fides of intent.17
The net effect of this formula, which the court found in the statutory
provisions, was to create an irrebuttable presumption of nonresiIt appears from the case that the right to travel is fundamental
whenever a traveler is somehow "penalized" as a result of his interstate movement and any statute infringing on that right is to be tested
by a compelling state interest standard. Whether the Court would
apply this same standard to a statute for tuition residence is open to
conjecture. The Court has not yet decided that the charging of higher
tuition rates is a "penalty" on interstate travel In addition, it may be
argued that under the particular circumstances of a student moving
into a state for the particular purpose of attending college that a one
year residence requirement is necessary to establish a bona fide residence at least for tuition purposes.
'5 187 Neb. at 257, 188 N.W.2d at 843 (emphasis added).
16 In addition, an argument may be made that under the recently
changed tax structure in Nebraska all students whether residents or
nonresidents meet this standard. Until recently, the only support for
the University of Nebraska was by a property tax and it probably
could be conceded that few, if any, nonresident students paid a
property tax which supported the university. Consequently, there
previously existed some basis for distinguishing residents and nonresidents in relation to tuition rates. However, today the tax structure
which supports the University is based on a sales and income tax and
every student pays sales tax on the purchases he makes in the state
and those students who have jobs also pay income tax. As a result,
there no longer exists any sound reason for distinguishing residents
and nonresidents at least in tuition rates.
17 187 Neb. at 258, 188 N.W.2d at 844.
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dency in relation to tuition matters. Despite all the evidence that a
person could present to prove that he was a resident, unless he could
prove four months continual residence while not attending school,
he would be considered a nonresident for tuition purposes.
It is submitted that the court should have asked whether the

irrebuttable presumption had a reasonable basis. Instead, the court
held that if an original residency requirement had a reasonable
basis then it would be upheld. Since it was the former and not the
latter point that was contested by Thompson, it is submitted that
the court decided the wrong issue.

The only judge who considered the issue presented by the plaintiff was Judge McCown who in his dissent acknowledged the problem in these words:
There is no rational or reasonable basis on which an individual
who has been a bona fide resident of and domiciled in this state
for the initial time period required by statute, should be denied the
right to prove that fact simply because he was in attendance at
"any institution of learning in this state," whatever that term connotes.s
In short, the reasonable basis test should have been applied to the
irrebuttable presumption which prevented Thompson from even
attempting to prove his bona fide intention to reside within the
state. As Judge McCown indicated, there was no reasonable basis
to support the irrebuttable presumption.
The net effect of the court's analysis was that Thompson was
permanently classified a nonresident for tuition purposes as long as
he remained a student during continuous attendance at the University. As a result, it appears that the situation in Thompson was very
analogous to the situation in Carringtonv. Rash.19 In that case the
United States Supreme Court struck down a Texas constitutional
provision which prohibited any member of the Armed Forces having moved to Texas during the course of his military duty from
ever voting in any election in the state so long as he was a member
of the Armed Forces. While the Supreme Court recognized that
Texas was free to take reasonable and adequate steps to see that
all applicants for the vote actually fulfilled the requirements of
bona fide residence, this presumption of nonresidence went beyond
constitutional limits. The Court stated that: "By forbidding a soldier
ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, the Texas Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the
IsId. at 260, 188 N.W.2d at 845.
19 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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Fourteenth Amendment. '20 Although, as the appellant pointed out, 21
it may be possible to distinguish Carringtonfrom the situation in
Thompson since Carringtoninvolved a denial of the fundamental
right to vote while theoretically at least there was no denial of a
fundamental right to travel in Thompson,22 Carrington was not
discussed by the Nebraska court.
Not only did the majority opinion fail to consider the problems
raised by Carrington,but it also totally ignored a case which decided the identical issues presented in the Thompson case. In Newman v. Graham2 the court was faced with a challenge to a regulation of the State Board of Education of Idaho which provided:
"Any person who is properly classified as a non-resident student
retains that status throughout continuous regular term attendance
at any institution of higher learning in Idaho. ''24 The court found
that the regulation as interpreted by the board was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and held it invalid, stating:
Under the interpretation placed upon the foregoing quoted regulation by the Board it would necessarily follow that a student

who is a non-resident of the State at the time of initial enrollment

at the College would, if he attends each regular term, retain such

status throughout his entire college career irrespective of the fact

that he may have become a bona fide resident and domiciled more
than six months in the State during the intervening time. Under
such interpretation it does not afford any opportunity to show a
change of residential or domiciliary status and does in effect deny
equality of opportunity to persons of the same class who are similarly situated and for that reason it is an unreasonable regulation.
The authority of the Board, through its authorized agency or representative, to inquire into and ascertain an applicant's residential
or domicilary status is unquestioned. It is the denial to the applicant
of an opportunity to be heard in the matter, within a reasonable
time, that constitutes the objectionable feature of the regulation
here considered.
It
been
clear
upon
1958.
ciled

being stipulated that respondent has continuously resided and
domiciled in the State of Idaho since September, 1957, it is
that he was improperly classified as a non-resident student
registration for the regular term commencing in September,
At that time (September, 1958) respondent had been domiin the State for more than six months and was entitled to be

Id. at 96.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 5, Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187
Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
22 See notes 10 and 14 and accompanying text supra.
23 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960). For a general discussion of residency
requirements with respect to determining tuition fees see Annot., 83
A.L.R.2d 497 (1962).
24 82 Idaho at 92, 349 P.2d at 717.
20
21
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classified as other bona fide residents who had been domiciled in
the State for the required six month period.2 5
It should also be noted that all but one of the tuition cases cited
by the majority opinion2 6 dealt with the question of the validity
of original residency requirements which the Nebraska court early
in its opinion 27 recognized was not at issue in the Thompson case.
For example, it appears from a close reading of Starns v. Malkerson7 8 that the Nebraska court's continued reliance on that case was
misplaced. Although Starns dealt with an irrebuttable presumption
of nonresidency, this presumption dealt only with the original residency requirement lasting one year. In fact, in that case the plaintiffs were allowed the lower resident tuition rate to take effect their
second year of enrollment. Also, the court in Starns distinguished
the situation in that case from the one in Carrington since it did
not involve an absolute, permanent classification of nonresidency as
29
long as the plaintiffs continued in school.
The Nebraska court also relied on Kirk v. Board of Regents of
80
the University of California
to support its decision in Thompson.
The court in Kirk was also faced with a challenge to an original
residency requirement by a plaintiff alleging that she was a California resident and therefore entitled to the benefits of the resident
tuition rate. Although the court held the California provision constitutional, it noted that: "There is here unlike Newman and Carrington no arbitrary permanent class of non-residency which prohibits her from subsequently proving that she does in fact qualify
32
for resident tuition."3 1 Similarly the court in Clarke v. Redeker
upheld the original residency requirement in Iowa, but only so
long as it was not interpreted to deny the plaintiff the right to
3
prove residency merely because he continued his education. 3
Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 718-19.
Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem.,
401 U.S. 985 (1971); Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa
1966); Kirk v. Board of Regents of University of California, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969); Landwehr v. Regents of University of Colorado, 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
27 187 Neb. at 254, 188 N.W.2d at 842.
28 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
29 Id. at 240.
30 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969).
31 Id. at 443, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
25

26

32

33

259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
Id. at 122-23.
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The court also relied on American Commuters Association v.
Levitt34 as supporting its result. However, in that case the plaintiffs were nonresidents of New York who commuted to New York
City where they were employed. The action was brought to enjoin
enforcement against the plaintiffs of a New York statute which
imposed a tax on their earnings made in New York City. In the
alternative the plaintiffs asked for a declaratory judgment holding
unconstitutional various provisions of New York laws which afforded services and benefits to individuals who resided in New York
but not to the plaintiffs who were tax paying nonresidents of New
York. Among the alleged benefits denied were the rights to attend a
special high school in New York and the right to attend or be
eligible for a scholarship at a New York State University. Although
the court denied the plaintiffs the relief sought, it must be noted
that the plaintiffs acknowledged that they were nonresidents of
New York entitled to resident benefits from the mere fact that they
paid taxes in New York on earnings made in New York City. This
is clearly distinguishable from the issues in the Thompson case in
that Thompson alleged that he was a resident, of Nebraska and was
not challenging the right of the state to charge higher tuition to
nonresidents.
The result in Thompson, however, is directly supported by
Landwehr v. Regents of the University of Colorado. 35 In that case
the regulation under attack provided:
An emancipated minor or adult student who has registered for
more than five hours per term shall not qualify for a change in his
classification for tuition purposes unless he shall have completed
twelve continuous months of residence while not attending an
institution of higher learning in the state or while serving in the
armed forces. 6
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a legitimate
exercise of legislative determination and also found that it did not
constitute class legislation nor was it arbitrary or unreasonable.
However, it should be stressed that Landwehr was decided before
Carrington.
Consequently, it appears that of all the tuition cases cited by the
majority, only Landwehr directly supports its holding and that case
was decided before Carrington.Also while Starns, Kirk and Clarke
each upheld the original residency requirements of that particular
state, there is strong dicta in each of those decisions to suggest that
34
35
36

279 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969).
156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
Id. at 4, 396 P.2d at 452.
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if that court were faced with a provision similar to the one in
Thompson, i.e., fixing a permanent classification, it would have held
the provision unconstitutional. In addition, the Levitt case dealt
with a challenge by acknowledged nonresidents rather than by one
claiming to be a resident. Not only is the majority opinion to be
noted for what it cites as controlling authority, but it should also
be noted for the two cases which it fails to cite and discuss, Car'rington and Newman, which raise many issues left unanswered
by the majority.
It is submitted that the following would have been a better
resolution of the issues, both from a viewpoint of judicial reasoning
and from a viewpoint of the equities. First, the court should have
ruled that the statute was severable and allowed the original residency requirement to stand, thus protecting the legitimate and reasonable state interest in attempting to partially equalize costs.

Second, the court could still have made the question of residency
one of bona fide intention but erased the irrebuttable presumption
and instead placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove his intent
to establish Nebraska as his residence. In this way the State is able

to protect its interests, and justice is accorded the student who for
various reasons was unable to wait a semester merely to meet the

tuition residency requirements.
Although Thompson is interesting for the decision it reached
regarding the right to travel, it is also interesting for what it failed
to decide concerning the problem of the irrebuttable presumption.
From the Thompson opinion one may be confident that the new
statutory tuition scheme is constitutional,3 7 but a closer reading of
the opinion may still raise a question whether the same may be confidently said for the former statutory scheme challenged by Thompson.
87

However, the constitutionality of any durational residence statute may
be open to question in light of Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
See note 14 supra.
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II. CRIMINAL LAW

A. COERCED CONSENT AND STANDING TO CHALLENGE SEARCH
William Holloway was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in
the Nebraska Penal Complex following a conviction for the armed
robbery of an Omaha tavern on December 13, 1968. The issues considered on appeal were whether there was sufficient probable cause
to allow the issuance of a search warrant,' whether the defendent
had standing to challenge the search and whether the consent to
search the house given by the owner was coerced. The Nebraska
Supreme Court found that while there was insufficient probable
cause to support a search warrant, the owner gave the police her
uncoerced consent to the search and the defendant lacked standing
to challenge the search. 2 The issues of coerced consent and of standing will be the subject of this discussion.
In the course of their investigation of a series of robberies,
Omaha police officers learned from an informant that the individuals suspected of committing these crimes were known to go to
the home of the informant's sister, Christabelle Jenkins.3 The informant gave the police this information on the day of the tavern
robbery and a search warrant had already been obtained for the
Jenkins residence several hours prior to that incident. Upon receiving word of the tavern robbery, six police officers converged upon
the Jenkins home. The policemen showed the search warrant to a
minor son of Mrs. Jenkins who allowed them to enter. The police
found the defendant inside and placed him under arrest. An exhaustive search took place culminating in the discovery of various
items of incriminating evidence. According to the testimony of both
Mrs. Jenkins 4 and police officers, 5 the search was well under way
before two policemen located Mrs. Jenkins and informed her of the
search of her home.
Considering the issue of probable cause 6 and applying the stan1 For a discussion of this topic see Nebraska Supreme Court Review, 50
NEB. L. REV.468, 485-89 (1971).
2 State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. 1, 6, 187 N.W.2d 85, 89 (1971).
3 Brief for Appellant at 11, State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d
85 (1971).
4 Id. at 6.
5 Id. at 11.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
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dards set forth in State v. LeDent7 and State v. Waits8 the Nebraska
Supreme Court held the search warrant invalid because the affidavit stated nothing more than a bare conclusion, reciting neither
the circumstances under which the informant drew his conclusions
nor any basis for establishing the informant's credibility.9
The court ruled, however, that the invalidity of the search warrant did not render the seized evidence inadmissible. Relying upon
Maxwell v. Stephens ° for the proposition that consent freely and
State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917
(1970), writ of habeas corpus denied, 334 F. Supp. 64 (1971), appeal
docketed, No. 711656, 8th Cir., Nov. 17, 1971. Here the Nebraska Supreme Court sustained the validity of a search warrant based on an
informant's tip. The court held that the affidavit presented to the
issuing authority must reveal (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant drew his conclusions and (2) some
of the underlying circumstances from which the interrogating officer
or affiant concluded that the informant himself was reasonably credible. In determining the validity of the affidavit for the search warrant,
the court restricted consideration only to the information actually
presented to the magistrate.
s State v. Waits, 185 Neb. 780, 178 N.W.2d 774 (1970). Here the Nebraska
Supreme Court relied on United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109
(1964), in setting a standard for reviewing affidavits, and held that
while sufficient recital of some of the underlying circumstances in
the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his necessary
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police, the
courts should not invalidate a warrant by interpreting the affidavit
in a hypertechnical, rather than commonsense manner.
9 See generally Brief for Appellant at 8, 9, and 10, State v. Holloway,
187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85 (1971), indicating that other information
given by the informant concerning wholly unrelated matters to the
instant case, which might have been sufficient to establish credibility,
was not verified until after the search warrant was issued.
The actual affiidavit stated as "grounds for the issuance of a search
warrant" only as follows: "Information received from an informant
whose information has been reliable in the past." Id. at 29.
Chief Justice White, concurring in the result, felt that once the
majority resolved the issue of defendant's lack of standing, it was
unnecessary to deal with the issue of the sufficiency of the affidavit
of probable cause. He said that portion of the opinion was "pure
dictum" and was not binding on the court. 187 Neb. at 8, 187 N.W.2d
at 91
10 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965). Maxwell
appealed his rape conviction on grounds, inter alia, that police officers
violated his Fourth Amendment rights when, after taking him into
custody at the home of his parents, they later returned to the house
and obtained permission from defendant's mother to search his room.
The police seized various items of clothing worn by the defendant at
the time of the crime which aided the victim in later identifying
Maxwell as her assailant. The court found valid consent to the search.
7
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intelligently given by the proper person eliminates questions otherwise existing as to the propriety of a search, the court held that
Mrs. Jenkins consented to the search of her home. The court further found that Mrs. Jenkins was the only person who had sufficient interest in the place searched to give such consent. The majority felt that the status of the defendant at the time of the entry
was nothing more than that of an interloper or trespasser, thus the
defendant had no standing to challenge the legality of the search.
Although the court asserted that the issue of consent is intertwined
with the issue of standing, an attempt will be made to consider the
two issues separately.
1. Consent
The issue of coerced consent to a search given to police by a
homeowner who is not a defendant in the prosecution is not new
to the Nebraska court. Such a situation was encountered in State
v. McCreary" where the court sustained the validity of a search
of an apartment being used by the defendant and his girlfriend.
In McCreary a search warrant was obtained and presented to the
girlfriend's father who "consented" to the search, neither questioning the warrant nor even examining it. The father informed the
police that he was paying the rent on the apartment, that it was his
apartment, and that the police did not need a warrant to search.2
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held the father's consent
to be valid. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed McCreary's conviction in
view of the validity of the search warrant.13 The court of appeals
was nonetheless critical of the finding of the Nebraska Supreme
Court, as well as the Federal District Court, that the father's con4
decided
sent was valid. Relying on Bumper v. North Carolina,1
But in McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 984 (1969), the court of appeals found the state's reliance on the
Maxwell rule misplaced as the question in McCreary, as it is in Holloway, centered around the coercive effects of a search warrant.
11 179 Neb. 589, 139 N.W.2d 362, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 979 (1966).
12 Id. at 595, 139 N.W.2d at 366.
13 McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984
(1969).
14 391 U.S. 543 (1968). Here the Supreme Court found that the consent
given by a 66-year-old Negro widow to search her isolated rural home
when confronted by four white law enforcement officers who announced that they had a search warrant was not voluntarily given.
The idea that coerced consent to a search is no consent appeared in
several earlier decisions. In United States v. Elliot, 210 F. Supp. 357,
369 (D. Mass. 1962) the court held: "Orderly submission to law en-
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subsequent to the district court decision, the court of appeals found
the father's consent to be impliedly coerced and ineffectual.
The Supreme Court expressly held in Bumper that consent given
only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he
possesses a warrant is not valid when the only showing is no more
than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.1 5 A search so conducted cannot be later justified on the basis of consent if ultimately
the warrant is ruled invalid.16 The Supreme Court said, "When a
law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to
resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit
colorably lawful coercion."' 7 Applying this rationale, the McCreary
court ruled that an officer must have a legal basis for obtaining
access to private premises under the authority of the law. When the
police rely on owner consent to justify a search and that consent is
premised upon the fact that the police have a search warrant, it will
not be effectual unless the warrant itself is valid.'8
An examination of the testimony of Mrs. Jenkins and of the
police officers would tend to indicate that her consent was given in
the forbidden atmosphere contemplated by the Bumper and
McCreary decisions. When the police officers confronted Mrs. Jenkins at the Workman's Club two blocks from her house, they did
not ask for permission to search, but told her that they had a search
warrant for her home.' 9 The police advised her that a search had
already revealed the proceeds of a robbery in her home and that

15
16
17

18

19

forcement officers who, in effect, represented to the defendant that
they had the authority to enter and search the house, against his will
if necessary, was not such consent as constituted an understanding,
intentional and volutary waiver by the defendant of his fundamental
rights under the Fouth Amendment." See also Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1947); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313,
317 (1920).
391 U.S. at 548-49.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1969). See also State
v. Fourney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967), interloctory proceedings aff'd, 182 Neb. 802, 157 N.W.2d 405 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1044 (1969), wherein this same principle, that coerced consent is
no consent, was accepted by the court with respect to coerced consent
obtained from the actual defendant in the prosecution.
Brief for Appellant at 12, State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d
85 (1971). There is some indication that Mrs. Jenkins was not informed of the search warrant until she arrived at her home in the
company of the two police officers.
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she had to come with them.20 The actual warrant was neither shown
nor read to her until after she agreed to the search and was taken
by the police officers to her home. 21 Mrs. Jenkins further stated that
she cooperated with the police because she was receiving welfare
assistance and she was fearful of losing such benefits should she
resist the police in their efforts. 22 Apprehension about her welfare
status and an obvious fear of her own prosecution as an accomplice
or as an accessory to the robbery would seem to preclude any doubt
that Mrs. Jenkins' consent was given under duress and coercion.
Finally, while the language of the opinion might also imply that the
cooperation given by Mrs. Jenkins resulted from her life long acquaintance with one of the police officers and hence might not have
been influenced by her fears, such an explanation would still find
that consent the result of coercion.
2. Standing
Turning to the standing issue, the court accepted the criteria
24
established in Jones v. United States23 and Mancusi v. DeForte
and indicated that the issues of standing and consent are inevitably
mixed. The Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned that a finding of
ineffective consent on behalf of Mrs. Jenkins would demand a collateral finding that Holloway was the only individual who could
consent to a search of the Jenkins home. 25 The Nebraska court declared that neither the Mancusi nor the Jones standard was intended

21

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.

22

Id. at 7.

20

23

362 U.S. 257 (1960). While the defendant was in an apartment, which

he later testified was not his but that of a friend who let him use it,
the apartment was searched by federal authorities armed with a
search warrant. Narcotics were found and seized, and the defendant
was charged with violating federal narcotics laws. In remanding the
case, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the defendant
had no standing to challenge the search due to his lack of a property
interest in the premises. The Court enunciated a new test for standing
recognizing that anyone legitimately on the premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by a motion to suppress.
24 392 U.S. 364 (1968). State officials without a search warrant seized
certain books and records of the defendant from an office that the
defendant shared with several other people. The seized material was
admitted into evidence at defendant's trial for conspiracy. Regarding
the issue of standing, the Supreme Court found that the defendant had
standing to challenge the search because the area searched was one
in which he had a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. Id. at 369.
25 187 Neb. at 6, 187 N.W.2d at 90.
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to encompass a defendant whom the court labeled a mere "trespasser."-26
Although the issues of consent and standing present overlapping
problems, they should be considered as distinct. The issue of consent
focuses on the legality of the search. In contrast, the issue of standing is determined by the relationship of the defendant to the place
searched and the thing seized. It is difficult to understand the Nebraska court's reasoning that a finding of ineffectual consent necessarily means that a person who has no interest in the property would
be the only one who could consent. The two issues are unrelated. It
would seem possible to find that there was no voluntary consent and
also find that because of defendant's relationship to the Jenkins
home he did or did not have standing.
The law of standing had its origins in the common law rules of
trespass to real property2 7 and originally applied to a relatively
small class of persons. 28 It abounded with subtle technical distinctions as to the nature of defendant's status in relation to the article
or premises.- As a general rule, it had been required that in order
for one to show the requisite standing to object to evidence obtained
in violation of another's Fourth Amendment rights, he must claim
ownership in or right to possession of either the property seized or
the premises searched.30 Applying traditional property concepts the
courts consistently held that one who sought to object on the basis
of his interest in the premises must show that such an interest was
greater than that of a "guest."31 In Jeffers v. United States32 the de187 Neb. at 7, 187 N.W.2d at 90.
See, Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonable Seized Evidence,
47 Nw. U.L. REV. 471 (1952).
28 If the defendant was the owner, but not the occupant, he was denied standing to challenge evidence obtained by way of an illegal
search and seizure. Similiarily, employees could not object, Kelly v.
United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932); nor could a bailee, Lewis
v. United States, 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1937).
29 Compare United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) with
United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944), where the courts
struggle to determine if the defendant had "possession" of an article.
30 See Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Kitt v.
United States, 132 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942); Daddio v. United States,
125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942).
31 E.g., United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1954). In Accardo
v. United States, 247 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the police seized stolen
property at an apartment at which defendant had been a guest. The
court ruled that defendant had no standing to file a motion to suppress
the stolen property as evidence.
32 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Here the defendant moved to exclude from evidence contraband narcotics claimed by him but which were seized on
the premises of another in a warrantless search.
26
27
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fendant was unable to show such a sufficient interest in the premises, but the Supreme Court held that a defendant could establish
standing by a showing of ownership or possession of the article
seized. The Court reasoned that, "The Fourth Amendment prohibits
both unreasonable searches and unreasonable seizures, and its protection extends to both 'houses' and 'effects.' -"3
Courts have frequently indicated that one may not claim a right
under the Constitution unless he is a member of the class for whose
benefit the constitutional protection was made.3 4 Without a personal
right in the property or premises a defendant could not be heard
to complain of a search and seizure which violated the rights of
another. But such a limitation on the exclusionary rule has drawn
severe criticism 5 and a host of seemingly inequitable decisions. 36
Yet every federal circuit has held that the privilege to object to
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right 37 and the
33

Id. at 51.

34 People ex rel Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
35

See Darling, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure,
15 WYo. L.J. 218 (1961); Moffat, Constitutional Law-Searches and
Seizures-Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 14
Sw. L.J. 521 (1960); Nicholas, Constitutional Law-Persons Entitled
to Raise ConstitutionalQuestions-Standing to Suppress Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 59 MicH. L. REv. 444
(1961); Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE
L.J. 144 (1948) (criticizing the limitation as an unwarranted emphasis

on the joinder of the Fifth Amendment, which is personal, to the

Fourth Amendment, which is essentially a broad grant of immunity);
Smith, Evidence-Standing to Object to Unlawful Search and Seizure,
24 GA. B.J. 131 (1961).
36 See United States v. De Vasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 678 (1931). Here defendants formed a corporation that leased
a brewery ostensibly to produce "near beer" but secretly manufacturing genuine beer in violation of the National Prohibition Act. In a
raid, government agents seized the corporation's falsified records and
introduced them as evidence in the subsequent prosecution. The court
denied standing to the defendants to challenge the search finding them
only stockholders. Since the books were purchased by the corporation
and kept by its bookkeeper, they were corporate records, and any
search if illegal only violated the corporations rights and not those of
the defendants. See also A. Guckenheimer & Bros. v. United States,
3 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 688 (1925).
37 Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Pepe, 247 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1957); Accardo v. United States, 247 F.2d
568 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 898 (1957); Lovette v. United
States, 230 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1956); Baskervill v. United States, 227
F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1955); Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th
Cir. 1955); United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1954);
Brubaker v. United States, 183 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1950); Grainger v.
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states dealing with the issue have also insisted upon an element of
s
personal interest.3
Against this background, the Supreme Court in 1960 decided
Jones v. United States,39 the first comprehensive treatment by the
Court with regard to the requisite standing needed to invoke the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. In Jones the defendant was
indicted for illegal possession of narcotics. The drugs were uncovered by a search of an apartment in which the defendant was a
guests. The defendant moved to supress the evidence obtained on
the grounds that the search was illegal. The prosecution challenged
the standing of the defendant to make such a motion since he had
alleged neither ownership nor an interest in the premises other than
that of an "invitee" or "guest." In a unanimous reversal of the lower
court's determination of the standing question 0 the Court noted:
Two separate lines of thought effectively sustain defendant's standing in this case. (1) The same element in this prosecution which has
caused a dilemma, i.e., that possession both convicts and confers
standing, eliminates any necessity for a preliminary showing of an
interest in the premises searched or the property seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged. (2) Even were this
not a prosecution turning on illicit possession, the legally requisite
interest in the premises was here satisfied, for it need not be as extensive a property interest as was required by the courts below.41
United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946); United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); Kitt v. United States, 132
F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942); Ingram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966 (9th
Cir. 1940); Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 759 (1937); Schnitzer v. United States, 77 F.2d 233
(8th Cir. 1935); Kwong How v. United States, 71 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.
1934); Gowling v. United States, 64 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1933); Cravens
v. United States, 62 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1932); Mabee v. United States,
60 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1932); Nunes v. United States, 23 F.2d 905 (1st
Cir. 1928); Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1926).
38 See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 571 (1956). California is the one exception. In People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955), California
adopted an exclusionary rule on its own initiative, relying on the
deterrence of illegal police activity theory. Judge Traynor speaking
for a unanimous court declared that a third party had standing to
object to an illegal search and seizure whether or not it violated his
particular constitutional rights.
39 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
40 Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the decision as to standing but
dissented on the ground that the warrant was issued without probable
cause. Id at 273.
41 Id at 263.
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The Court sought to put an end to the famous "dilemma" as
articulated by Judge Learned Hand,42 that regularly denied standing
to defendants in search and seizure cases where the article seized
was contraband or of a highly incriminating nature. Ordinarily, in
order for the defendant in such a situation to challenge the search
and seek suppression of the evidence obtained, he must first have
had to admit ownership or possession of the incriminating article.
Since ownership or possession was usually sufficient in itself to
sustain a conviction, the defendant refusing to claim the article
seized was denied standing. In rejecting the "dilemma" the Court
stated that to hold otherwise would not be "consonant with the
amenities . . .of the administration of criminal justice" in that it
would allow the government to benefit from the contradictory positions of denying ownership for the purpose of depriving defendant
of the exclusionary rule and alleging ownership for the purpose of
conviction.
With regard to the second ground, the Court rejected the long
line of lower court decisions that had used common law property
principles to determine standing:
We do not lightly depart from the course of decisions of lower
courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill
advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions developed and refined by the common law... .43
In place of the common law distinctions, the Court enunciated
a much more liberal and practical test to determine standing: "No
just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing
that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may
challenge its legality by way of a motion
to suppress when its fruits
44
are proposed to be used against him."
Jones does not purport to discard the notion that standing can
be established by a showing of a possessory or proprietary interest
in either the premises or the property. It merely adds an additional
42

43
44

Connoly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932), wherein Judge Hand
observed: '"en may wince at admitting that they were the owners,
or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure
the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but
equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they must take
on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The
petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were
obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma."
362 U.S. at 266.
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
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element with the intent to significantly enlarge the class of people
who may have standing. In arriving at the decision that the defendant was legitimately on the premises, Justice Frankfurter made
reference twice to direct testimony of the defendant that the lessee
gave him permission to us the apartment. 45 With few exceptions the
federal courts 6 and an increasing number of state courts4 7 have
found standing where the defendant was on the premises with the
owner's permission.
An examination of the testimony in the instant case would indicate that essentially this same type of permission was given Holloway by Mrs. Jenkins. She admitted knowing the defendant all her
life, that he frequently came to her home and that he had implied
permission to do so even in her absence. 48 When it ignores such
testimony the Nebraska Supreme Court seems to repudiate the very
basis of the expanded standing test of Jones.
Once having called the defendant a trespasser 49 the Nebraska
court, for all practical purposes, also rejected the standard established in Mancusi v. DeForte" while attempting to formally agree
with it. In Mancusi state officials armed with a subpoena duces
tecum, but without a search warrant, seized certain files from an
office shared by DeForte and several others. Over DeForte's objection the seized material was admitted into evidence. In determining that DeForte did have standing to challenge the search, the
Supreme Court articulated a principle implied in Katz v. United
States,51 a telephone conversation "seizure" case, and extended it to
45 Id. at 259, 265.
46

See, e.g., Garza-Fuentes v. United States, 400 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.),

47

731 (5th Cir. 1968); Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir.
1962); United States v. Pisano, 191 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
See generally State v. Allen, 9 Ariz. App. 196, 450 P.2d 708 (1969);

cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969); Montoya v. United States, 392 F.2d

Dean v. Fogliani, 81 Nev. 541, 407, P.2d 580 (1965); State v. Michaels,
60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962); Kluck v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 378,
155 N.W.2d 26 (1967).
48 Brief for Appellant at 20, 26, State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. 1, 187
N.W.2d 85 (1971).
49 187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85.
50 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
51 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Here federal agents "seized" incriminating telephone conversations through the use of electronic "bugging" devices
attached to the outside of a public telephone booth. In finding that

defendants' Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced the rule that that the Fourth Amendment protects
people and not places, and although one may be in a place readliy
accessible to the public, that which he seeks to preserve as private

may be constitutionally protected.
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physical seizures in Mancusi. The Court said that Katz had made
it clear that the capacity to claim protection of the Fourth Amendment no longer depended solely upon a property right in the invaded place, but rather upon whether the area was one in which
there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion.
The Mancusi standard is another extension of standing and a
number of state decisions have given the decision literal interpretation. In State v. Matias52 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that
a defendant who was an overnight guest at an apartment had standing to challenge a search made with neither an arrest warrant nor a
search warrant, even though the tenant had given his consent to
the search. Relying on Jones and Mancusi the Hawaii court found
that the consent of the tenant operated only to waive the tenant's
rights under the Fourth Amendment, but the tenant's guests had
standing to challenge the legality of the governmental intrusion.
In Derby v. Cupp 53 the judge, in referring to the concept of "reasonable expectations" noted that in both Jones and Mancusi the defendants had a continuing interest in the premises in that they were
always able to return to the place to carry on business or merely
to relax. While the concept of "reasonable expectations" is difficult
to apply, it would seem that its emphasis remains on the extent of
interest the defendant has in the premises. At some point he attains
sufficient interest in a place to be entitled to privacy. DeForte and
Jones attained such an interest via owner permission, and it would
seem from the testimony in the instant case that Holloway had at
least as much.
It would appear that the Nebraska court intends to narrowly
interpret the Supreme Court's decisions concerning a third party's
right to challenge a search and seizure and to continue to reject
the more liberalized basis for standing that is the essence of the
Jones and Mancusi decisions. In view of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning coerced consent to a search, the Nebraska court's
analysis of the circumstances surrounding the consent given by
Mrs. Jenkins may have sanctioned consent that was constitutionally
suspect.
52
-3

51 Hawaii 62, 451 P.2d 257 (1969).
302 F. Supp. 686 (D. Ore. 1969).
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B. PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION

Raymond Moss was convicted of robbery, the use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony, and sodomy. All of the charges arose

out of the same incident.' The primary basis of the defendant's
appeal concerned the use of photographic identification while the
defendant was in custody. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that
the accused did not have a right to counsel at such an identification. 2
This note will discuss the use of photographic identification of a
suspect and the effect of its misuse.
The facts indicate that the female sodomy victim was assaulted
by an unknown Negro man who robbed her and then forced her
to participate in the act of sodomy. While the crime was in progress,
a deliveryman rang the doorbell. The assailant answered the door
and robbed the tradesman s That same day the sodomy victim
examined a large number of photographs provided by the police.
She selected one photograph of a man who resembled her assailant,
but she did not make a positive identification. 4 Apparently, the
victim's selection was not a photograph of the defendant Moss. 5
Two days later, in an unrelated incident, the police used tear gas
to force the defendant Moss out of a house across the street from
where the sodomy victim lived. The victim then observed Moss and
identified him as her assailant. 6 After the defendant was taken into
custody the police showed the witness five photographs. All five
photographs were of Negro men, but two of the pictures were of
the defendant and three were of other individuals. 7 The victim
picked the two photographs of the defendant. On cross-examination
concerning the photograph which she had selected on the day of the
commission of the acts, the witness "acknowledged she had difficulty

identifying Negro males,"8 however, she had identified Moss at the
I All of the charges arose out of acts alleged to have been committed
by the accused on the morning of August 8, 1970. State v. Moss, 187
Neb. 391, 392, 191 N.W.2d 543, 543 (1971).
2 Id. at 394, 191 N.W.2d at 545.
3 The facts are set out in more complete detail in the briefs of the
parties. See Brief for Appellant at 5-12, and Brief for Appellee at
3-5, State v. Moss, 187 Neb. 391, 191 N.W.2d 543 (1971).
4 187 Neb. at 393, 191 N.W.2d at 544.
5 Id. The report was not clear on this, but there was some indication
that the photograph was not that of Moss.
6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id. One of the major problems in pre-trial identification, in person
or by photograph, is the recognized inability of members of one race
to distinguish between members of another race. See P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CInVINAL CASES 122-25 (1965); 50 NEB.
L. REv. 474, 478 (1970).
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pre-trial hearing because he had "been in her home
' and that there
was no doubt in her mind that he was the man."
The deliveryman also made a positive in-court identification of
the defendant as the man who robbed him.10 On the day of the
robbery the deliveryman had examined several photographs at the
police station and picked out two which he identified as resembling
the man who had robbed him.' Apparently, one of these two photographs was not of the defendant. 12 After the accused was in custody
the deliveryman was again shown photographs by the police, and
he identified two of the five shown as being photographs of his
assailant. 13 The witness testified at the pre-trial hearing that his
identification of the defendant was not based on the photographs. 14
The defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that
the photographic identification was so impermissibly suggestive
that it gave rise to the likelihood of irreparable misidentification
and that he had been denied a constitutional right to counsel during
the photographic identification because the identification was being
used as a substitute for a formal line-up.' 5 The trial court had held
a "Wade-Gilbert-Stoval hearing"' 6 to determine if the in-court eyewitness identification should be suppressed as being tainted by a
suggestive photographic identification procedure. The trial court
had found that the witnesses' identifications were independent of
the use of the photographic identification.' 7 The Nebraska Supreme
Court rejected both arguments of the defendant and reiterated its
holding in State v. Randolph, 8 saying that:
9 187 Neb. at 393, 191 N.W.2d at 544.
10 Id. at 394, 191 N.W.2d at 544.
11 Id. at 393, 191 N.W.2d at 544.

Id. at 393-94, 191 N.W.2d at 544. The witness had picked two photographs from the I.D.M.O. file, one a front view and one a profile view,
believing them to be the same person. Brief for Appellant at 10, Brief
for Appellee at 4. Also, although there was evidence that the defendant's photograph was in that file and that both witnesses examined
the file, there was doubt as to whether any of the photographs examined by the two witnesses were of the defendant. Brief for Appellee
at 4, State v. Moss, 187 Neb. 391, 191 N.W.2d 543 (1971).
'3 187 Neb. at 394, 191 N.W.2d at 544. Both photographs were of the
defendant and the other three were of other individuals. Brief for
Appellant at 5, State v. Moss, 187 Neb. 391, 191 N.W. 2d 543 (1971).
14 Id. at 394, 191 N.W.2d at 544.
15 Id. at 392, 191 N.W.2d at 543-44.
16 This refers to the cases known as the "right to counsel at a line-up
triology." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
'7 187 Neb. at 392, 191 N.W.2d at 544.
18 186 Neb. 297, 183 N.W.2d 225 (1970).
12
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Each case must be considered on its own facts and that conviction
based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pre-trial
identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only
if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.' 9

The Nebraska court then dismissed the defendant's argument for

a right to counsel at such photographic identification by pointing
out that the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts
proposition, and the Supreme Court had not yet
had rejected that
20
held differently.
This note takes the position that photographic identification is

useful for apprehending the suspect but usually has no purpose
after the accused has been taken into custody and is available for
a line-up.2 ' Further, such identification is at least as fraught with
the danger of misidentification and suggestion as is a line-up. Thus,
counsel should be present at the proceedings or, at least, procedures
should be used which would enable counsel to determine the manner in which the identification was conducted.
An analysis of the argument that counsel is needed at the photographic identification begins with the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution which provides that the defendant in a criminal case will
2
have the aid of counsel in his defense.P By virtue of the Escobedo 3
and Miranda-4 cases, the right to counsel was extended to police
interrogations. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United
19 187 Neb. at 394, 191 N.W.2d at 545. The Nebraska Supreme Court was
quoting the United States Supreme Court holding in Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
20 187 Neb. at 394-95, 191 N.W.2d at 545. The court cited United States
v. Fowler, 439 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ballard,
423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennet, 409 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288 (8th Cir.
1971); United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970); Rech v. United
States, 410 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Robinson, 406
F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1969).
21 If the accused does not consent to a line-up then the only alternative
is to use the photographic identification. The Nebraska Supreme Court
met this problem in such a manner in State v. Tramble, 187 Neb. 488,
191 N.W.2d 822 (1971). However, it should be pointed out that because there is no alternative to a photographic identification is not
a justification for denying counsel at such a procedure, especially
when it is used as a substitute to a line-up.
22
23
24

U.S. CoxsT. amend. VI.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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States held that the accused had a right to counsel at a police lineup used for the purpose of pre-trial identification.2 5 Counsel was required so that the issue of the credibility of the identification could
be effectively argued. Is is difficult to prove that the police influenced the witness 26 at the line-up if counsel is not present during
the procedure. 27 However, in Simmons v. United States28 the Supreme Court declined to extend the right of counsel to photographic
identifications. In that case the question before the Court was
whether the photographic identification procedure was too suggestive, not whether the accused had a right to counsel at such a
proceeding.2 The Court said that it would not reverse a conviction
based on pre-trial photographic identification unless it was so "impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification."3 0 The Court admitted that the improper
use of photographs by the police sometimes causes witnesses to
err in identifiying criminals,31 but felt in this case that 3the
photo2
graphic identification procedure was not that misleading.
In United States v. Marson33 the defendant had argued that the
Wade and Gilbert decisions referred not just to line-ups but also to
photographic identifications. Without deciding the issue the Court
25

26

27

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1968). There the Court pointed
out that the right to counsel could be rendered nugatory by misidentification in the absence of counsel.
Some of the suggestive methods used by police in line-ups and photographic identification are described in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1968), and P. WALL, supra note 8, at 53. They include such methods
as having all members of the line-up known to the witness except the
suspect, and having the suspect being the only Oriental in a line-up
of six Caucasian men.
Comment, Criminal Procedure-Photo-Identiflcations,43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1019, 1028 (1968).

28

29

30

390 U.S. 377 (1968).
There the police used a photographic identification before the defendant had been taken into custody. The Court recognized that the defendant was not claiming a right of counsel at his identification, as
he was not yet in custody nor his identity established, but was rather
claiming the procedure was so suggestive as to taint his identification
in court. Id. Likewise the Nebraska Supreme Court, in two cases where
the photographic identification was prior to the suspect being taken
into custody, has limited the question to the suggestiveness of the procedure. State v. Reed, 188 Neb. 195, 195 N.W.2d 503 (1972); State
v. Evans, 187 Neb. 474, 192 N.W.2d 145 (1971).
390 U.S. at 384.

31 Id. at 383.
32
33

Id. at 385.
408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968).
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed on the grounds that
Stovall v. Denno34 had held the Wade and Gilbert decisions to be
prospective only.8 5 The Third Circuit has gone farther however. In
United States v. Zeilers 6 the court pointed out that Wade had recognized that suggestive pre-identification procedures used by the
police were a major factor in causing mistaken identifications and
that these mistakes were rarely corrected because the witness was
unlikely to change his mind once he has made his identification.
The court in Zeiler felt that the defendant was not able to effectively contest the reliability of the photographic identification procedure because neither he nor his counsel were present. The court
pointed out that:
The considerations that led the court in Wade to guarantee the
right of counsel at line-ups apply equally to photographic identifications conducted after the defendant is in custody. The dangers
of suggestion inherent in a corporal line-up identification are cer-

tainly as prevalent in a photographic identification.... Also the

defendant himself, not being present at such a photographic identification, is even less able7 to reconstruct at trial what took place unless

counsel was present.
The Zeiler court held that such a procedure after the accused was
in custody was a substitute for a line-up, and that therefore counsel
was required.3 8 The court also held that if counsel were not present,
the photographic identification would not be admissible, and because
of Wade the government would have the burden of "establishing
by clear and convincing evidence"3 9 that the witness was not influenced by the prior improper photographic confrontation. 40 The
34 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
85 408 F.2d at 649.

86 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970). In this case the police showed photographs to the witnesses for the purpose of identification of the defendant after the defendant was in custody and just prior to a line-up
of the defendant. For another analysis of the impact of this case see

48 NMD. L. REv. 511 (1972).
427 F.2d at 1307.
8 Id. The court distinguished the Zeiler case from the Simmons case in
that the Simmons case involved a photographic identification before
the suspect was taken into custody, while Zeiler involved a photographic identification after the suspect was taken into custody.

37

39 Id. at 1308.
40 Here the court said that since three of the eight photographs shown
were of the defendant and were snapshots whereas the others were
mugshots, and since the defendant was the only one wearing glasses
and the felon was known to wear glasses, there were suggestive influences on the witness. Id. The court reversed all three convictions

of robbery because of the absence of counsel at the photographic iden-
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court stressed that since the defendant was in custody the photographic identification was unnecessary 41 and that, moreover, "the
constitutional safeguards that Wade guaranteed for line-ups may
be completely nullified if the police are able privately to confront
4' 2
witnesses prior to the line-up with suggestive photographs.
However the Third Circuit later re-examined its holding in
Zeiler and overruled that portion "which denominated a pre-trial
requiring the presence
photographic identification as a critical stage 43
of counsel to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.1

In United States v. Ash 44 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the right of the accused to counsel
at line-ups also applied to photographic identifications after the
suspect had been taken into custody. That court felt that the considerations that required counsel at line-ups applied to photographic
identifications as well. Those considerations were the possibility
of suggestive methods, the difficulty of reconstructing those suggestification. The court held the in-court identification in one of the convictions was inadmissible as it was unduly suggestive and remanded
the other two convictions to the trial court for determination whether
they were also tainted by a suggestive photographic identification procedure. The court on a later appeal of the case held that the other
eyewitness identifications were not fatally tainted as they were sufficiently independent of the suggestive photographic procedure which
had been conducted without the presence of counsel. United States v.
Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971).
41

427 F.2d at 1308.

42

Id. at 1307. The court also pointed out the dissent's fear in United
States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968), that the absence of a
requirement of counsel at photographic confrontations will actually
encourage the police to abuse the identification process and that the
use of photographs when unnecessary may well be such an abuse.
Reed v. Anderson, 40 U.S.L.W. 2736 (3d Cir. April 11, 1972). The
majority opinion said that the Zeiler decision brought on a "collision
course the public policy considerations of Wade . . . and Gilbert...
and the equally respected consideration that evidence relevant to the
truth-finding process should not be arbitrarily withheld from the
fact finder." Id. The majority opinion stated that it was a desirable
police practice to have counsel at a pre-trial photographic identification but that is was not a constitutional necessity. The dissenting
opinons both maintained that the same problems that affected corporeal
identification in the absence of counsel were even more involved with

43

photographic identification in the absence of counsel, since the de44

fendant must depend on the prosecution to relate what happened at
the photographic display.
10 Cnm . L. REP. 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This case involved the showing
of five photographs to a witness on the eve of the trial, which was
being held three years after the crime had occurred. The court's holding was a 5-4 decision.
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tive methods and the freezing of the witness's identification under
these circumstances. 5 The District of Columbia Circuit referred to
the reasoning used in the Zeiler case, but was careful to point out
that its holding was not intended to interfere with police investigations and that the right to counsel was not absolute. Apparently,
if the use of counsel created a delay which endangered the effectiveness of the continuing investigation, the right to counsel could be
disregarded. 46 However, a number of the other courts of appeals
have declined to require counsel at such a hearing, 47 and the
Supreme Court of the United States has not yet made such a requirement. It is thus clear that the weight of authority remains
against requiring counsel at such proceedings. 8
Identification of the suspect serves its most useful function during the investigative stage of the police work, i.e., before the accused
is taken into custody. 49 With a photograph the police are able to
get a precise description of the suspect that can easily be distributed
to investigating officers to assist them in tracking down the suspect.
The disadvantages of photographic identification are evident when
it is compared with an in-person identification. Photographs are two
dimensional rather than three dimensional, and some distinguishing
features may not be as apparent as they might be in person. Also,
people may tend to resemble each other in pictures while not resembling each other in person. 50 Thus when the witness sees a pic45
46
47

Id.
Id. at 1085-86.
In the following cases the witness was shown photographs of the
defendant after he was in custody and the Circuit Courts held there
was not a requirement for counsel at such procedure. United States v.

Fowler, 439 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Williams, 436
F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th
Cir. 1970). The Fowler court reversed conviction on the grounds that

the photographic identification procedure was so impermissively suggestive when the witness was shown only two photographs, both of
which were the defendant. See also, United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288
(8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1971);
Rech v. United States, 410 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Bennet, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969); and United States v. Robinson,
406 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1969).
48 See citations listed in People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212,
93 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1970), and State v. Royster, 57 N.J. 472, 273 A.2d
579 (1971).
49 P. WALL, supra note 8, at 81-82. Also, the Supreme Court of the United
States mentioned in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968),
that despite its hazards, the use of photographs served a vital function
in police preliminary investigations and that the Court would be unwilling to prohibit it.
50 Comment, Photographic Identification: The Hidden Persuader, 56
IowA L. REv. 408 (1968).
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ture which resembles the person that the witness saw commit the
crime, the witness's mind may then retain the picture image rather
than the image of the offender's face.51 When the subject of the photograph is brought before the witness, the witness truly believes
that this individual is the person who committed the act. The
argument is that the person the witness is identifying is the person
in the photograph and not necessarily the person the witness saw
commit the crime.5 2
Even with these disadvantages, the need for photographic identification prior to apprehension has been recognized. 53 However, in
most cases photographic identification is simply unnecessary when
the accused is in custody. 54 Mlisidentification is less likely to occur
during a line-up, and therefore, when the defendant is in custody,
photographic identification should not be used. 55
In addition to the problem of a witness retaining the image
of the photograph, there is the problem of the police misusing the
procedure in order to insure identification of a suspect whom they
believe to be the felon. As pointed out earlier, it is difficult for the
defense counsel to discover suggestive procedures if he is not present during the identification. Of course, the more obvious suggestive
methods can be discovered by cross-examination of the witness.
These include using other photographs of non-blacks when the accused is a black or using a photograph in which the clothing of the
accused or the background of the picture is notably different from
the other pictures. These methods are more likely to be noticed and
recalled by the witnesses. However, the witnesses are not as likely
to notice such devices as placing the photographs of the accused on
several pages of a "mug book," or subtle differences in the background, or the method in which the photograph is presented for
viewing in relationship to the other photographs. This problem
could be partially remedied by using a procedure in which the
51 Id.; P. WALL,

supra note 8, at 66-68; Simmons v. United States, 390

U.S. 377, 383 (1968).

See People v. Starling, 131 Ill. App. 2d 806, 266 N.E.2d 905 (1971).
There the dissenting opinion pointed out that the witness who
is shown a photograph before an in-court identification is made, may
be identifying the person in the photograph rather than the offender.
53 See note 49, supra.
54 There are circumstances where a photographic identification would be
necessary even when the accused is in custody, such as when the witness is physically unable to attend a regular line-up or the suspect
is in custody in a distant jurisdiction. P. WALL, supra note 8, at 72.
55 50 NEB. L. 1Ev. 474, 477 (1970); WmiAws & HuMmEmmANN, Identifi52

cation Parades, CRmI. L. REv. 479, 485 (1963).
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photographs used in the identification are identified, the methods
used to present the pictures are described, and the witnesses' respouses are recorded. 56 In this way the defense counsel would be able
to spot the use of a suggestive device. He would be able to examine
and compare the exact photographs used57 and the manner in which
they were shown to the witnesses. As a result, he would have the
information needed to cross examine the witness to discredit the
identification. This type of procedure would protect the accused
both before and after he is taken into custody in that the accused
would be better able to expose a prejudical display to the witnesses.58 However, even with this recording procedure the police
could falsify the record if they were truly bent on incriminating
the suspect. Thus counsel is necessary both as an observer and as
a deterrent to any such activity by the authorities.5 9
In this case the police showed five photographs to the witnesses
after the defendant was in custody, and of those five photographs,
two were of the defendant. 0 This alone would seem to be so suggestive as to give rise to the strong likelihood of misidentification
since arguably a witness who saw two pictures of the same man
would assume that that man was the one the police thought was
guilty. Also there is some question as to the similarity of the photographs. The sodomy victim did not examine the other three photographs because they did not "even vaguely" resemble her assailant.61 There is some indication that the individuals in the five
photographs were dissimilar in appearance. 62 The court stressed
56 Comment, supra note 60, suggests

this type of procedure and presents
a form which could be used by the police.
57 In People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1971), the court said that if the defense counsel is furnished the
exact photographs used in the identification the counsel can easily
discover the possibilty of prejudice. However, it should be noted that
even examining the photographs used in the procedure will not show
counsel the method of display or the gestures or comments used by
the police.
58 Id. There was apparently no recording procedure in the photographic
identification of Moss. Brief for Appellee at 4.
59 The function of counsel at line-ups is discussed in Comment, Lawyers
and Line-ups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967), and Comment, The Right to
Counsel During Pre-TrialIdentification Proceedings, 47 NEB. L. REV.
740 (1968). It can be argued that counsel should have the same function at a photographic identification.
60 187 Neb. at 393-94, 191 N.W.2d at 544. The police officer who showed
the photographs to the witness admitted that two of the five photographs shown were of the defendant.
61 Brief for Appellant at 7, State v. Moss, 187 Neb. 391, 191 N.W.2d 543
(1971).
62

Id at 5.
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that both witnesses made positive identifications at the trial,63 perhaps suggesting that this would eliminate the problem of a suggestive photographic procedure. However, since the defendant was
apparently the only black man in the court at the time of the
identification, the "independence" of the in-court identification and
the photographic identification is questionable. 64 In addition, the
problem of the witness retaining the image of the photograph rather
than the image of the felon would increase the likelihood of misidentification. 65 In this case both witnesses had misidentified at least
one photograph on the day of the occurrence.6 6 Since there was no
reason for the use of the photographic identification because the
suspect was available for a more reliable line-up, the question arises
as to whether the police were using the photographs to suggest
the guilt of the accused and to burn the accused's image into the
minds of the witnesses so as to give a stronger in-court identification. Also the question arises whether the police were trying to
avoid the requirement of counsel at a line-up by substituting a
67
photographic identification.
Witnesses will seldom be aware of certain suggestive methods
that may be used in photographic identifications. Yet the Nebraska
Supreme Court has bowed to the present weight of authority and
has held that the police may substitute a photographic identification procedure for a line-up and thus avoid the requirement under
the Wade doctrine that counsel must be present at a line-up. Thus
the defendant must rely on what the prosecution claims to have
occurred at the photographic identification with only a feeble
guarantee given by the right of cross-examination, as to the truthfulness and accuracy of the prosecution's story. The meagerness of
authority for requiring counsel at photographic identifications when
the accused is in custody is outweighed by the necessity of counsel
to insure protection from suggestiveness by the police and to protect the fundamental right of a party to have counsel present at
any time when the determination of his guilt is materially affected.
187 Neb. at 394, 191 N.W.2d at 544-45.
Id. at 394, 191 N.W.2d at 545.
65 See note 45, supra.
66 187 Neb. at 393, 191 N.W.2d at 544.
67 In People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1971), the dissenting opinion maintained that the use of a photographic identification after the defendant was in custody was for the
conscious purpose of evading the requirement of counsel at a line-up
and that "the opinion of the majority, therefore stands as an explicit
sanction of that evasion and an invitation to dispose of those requirements entirely by replacing corporal line-ups with photographic

63

64

line-ups."

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
C. PROBABLE CAUSE

Michael Waits appealed from a jury verdict finding him guilty
of unlawful possession of lysergic acid diethylamide, commonly
referred to as LSD,: and from his subsequent sentence of two years
in the Nebraska State Reformatory. The validity of the affidavit of
probable cause 2 supporting the search warrant and the scope of
the search were the basic issues on appeal. In affirming Waits'
conviction, the Nebraska Supreme Court ostensively reaffirmed
the standard established in State v. LeDen for determining the
sufficiency of affidavits of probable cause. This article will compare the two affidavits in an effort to determine if the Nebraska
court has further relaxed the probable cause standard which the
court 4found to be marginally complied with in the LeDent affidavit.
United States postal authorities alerted state narcotics officials
of the existence of a package addressed to Waits which they considered "suspicious in appearance." The postal officials held the
parcel until it was weighed, examined and marked for identification
by a Nebraska state patrolman. The package was not opened. A

search warrant was obtained and the package was sent in due
course to the home of the defendant. Law enforcement officers
I See generally NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-451 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
2 For an analysis of a minimum standard for probable cause established
in State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21 (1970), see Nebraska
Supreme Court Review, 50 NEB. L. REv. 468, 485-89 (1971).
3 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970), writ of
habeas corpus denied, 334 F. Supp. 64 (1971), appeal docketed, No.
711656, 8th Cir., Nov. 17, 1971. See note 2, supra.
4 Id. at 384, 176 N.W.2d at 24. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that
the affidavit for the search warrant marginally complied with constitutional requirements. That affidavit read: "[T]hat the said Larry
LeDent is a resident of the above address and is the son of the registered title holder; that a reliable informant related to the investigative authorities the said Larry LeDent has offered to the said reliable
informant certain narcotic drugs for resale; that on Friday, November 1, 1968, the said Larry LeDent told the said reliable informant
that he had fifty (50) lids of marijuana available and also a homemade brick of grass available for resale and that he knows the reliable informant knows that the narcotics are kept at the residence at
13450 Frederick Street, Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska ....
The
reliable informant has given your affiant other information that coincides with information received from other reliable sources. Said
reliable informant's information has been verified and that information received has been the truth. The said Larry LeDent is now charged
under an information charging him with possession of depressant or
stimulant drugs in a separate incident." Brief for Appellant at 13-14,
State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21 (1970).
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immediately set up police surveillance of the Waits home. Upon
delivery of the package the officers entered the home, seized the
package and arrested the defendant. The package was subsequently
opened by police and found to contain LSD.
Quoting the language of the LeDent opinion, the court said that
when an affidavit of probable cause premised upon the "tip" of an
informant is brought before a magistrate that official must be satisfied that a two part test has been met before a search warrant
issues. The magistrate must be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were located where he claimed and (2) some of the
underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant was credible. 5
The affidavit leading to the search warrant in Waits read:
Affiant has information that Michael Waits is in possession of
illegal drugs, including L.S.D. Affilant has received information
from Sgt. John Maley of the Omaha Police Dept. and other reliable
informants that said Michael Waits is associated with known drug
users and possessors of illegal drugs, particularly one Bud Medlock,
one William C. Larnan and one Thomas E. Swain and one John
L. Lenczowski, that illegal drugs were found in the possession of
the above named associates of Michael Waits. Afflant further states
that Mr. John Bullock of the Postal Inspector's office in Omaha
has advised affiant that Michael Waits has received letters and
packages from Hawaii and California and has sent money orders
to California which affiant believes to be in connection with the
receipt and possession of illegal drugs and particularly L.S.D.
Affiant is further informed by the Post-office Dept. that the package addressed and directed to Michael Waits from California which
is expected to 6contain illegal drugs is in the possession of said
Michael Waits.
Noting that the two sources of information specified in the
affidavit were law enforcement officials, the court cited United
States v. Ventresca7 for the rule that observations of fellow law
enforcement officers engaged in a common investigation are a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number"
The court seems to have implied that the status of the "informants"
here compensated for the affidavit's failure to recite any criteria of
credibility complying with the second half of the LeDent standard.
It is questionable, however, whether the information given by the
fellow law enforcement officers in Waits is of the type sanctioned by
the Ventresca Court.
5 185 Neb. at 783, 178 N.W.2d at 777.
6 Id. at 782, 178 N.W.2d at 777.
7 380 U.S. 102 (1964).
8 Id. at 111.
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In Ventresca several federal investigators of the Alcohol and
Tobacco Division of the Internal Revenue Service had conducted
a lengthy investigation focusing on the defendant and a suspected
illegal distillery operation in his home. After watching the home
for several days one of the investigators involved in the surveillance
summed up what he and other investigators had personally observed
in a detailed five page affidavit. The circuit court of appeals found
the affidavit insufficient to support a search warrant because it
could not be determined from the affidavit which were the afflant's
personal observations and which were statements based on information from other investigators.9 The court feared that the "information from other investigators" might be impermissible "hearsay
upon hearsay" passed on by the fellow investigators from unreliable, anonymous informers whose credibility was unknown. The
Supreme Court sustained the sufficiency of the affidavit, emphasizing that sufficient credibility was established by afflant's statement
under oath that the information in the affidavit was based either
on his own personal observations or personal observations of investigators assigned to the investigation.' 0 This element is lacking
with respect to the Omaha police officer mentioned in the Waits
affidavit. There is no basis for the statement which would negate
the danger that the information from "other investigators" might
be only rumor gleaned from unreliable underworld informers.
There is no mention that this police officer was ever a part of a
common investigation or that he obtained this information from
a reliable source. There is no reason to believe that he spoke from
personal observation. Considering the Ventresca emphasis on the
manner in which the law enforcement officials obtained their information and the qualification that mere conclusions in affidavits
are never sanctioned," it is doubtful that Ventresca meant to endow
a kind of "automatic credibility" upon law enforcement officials
as the Nebraska Supreme Court seems to imply.
Assuming that the information supplied by the Omaha police
officer stating that Waits was associated with four individuals with
a history of narcotics violations came from a reliable source, it is
still difficult to understand the value of such information in establishing probable cause. In Spinelli v. United States12 the defendant
9 Ventresca v. United States, 324 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1963).
10 380 U.S. at 110.

11 "This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits
which are purely conclusory, stating only the affiant's or an informer's
belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the 'underlying circumstances' upon which that belief is based." 380 U.S. at
108-09.
16 See note 4 supra.
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was convicted of illegal interstate gambling activities despite his
claim that the search warrant authorizing an FBI search of his
home was invalid because the supporting affidavit failed to reveal
probable cause. As a part of the basis for showing probable cause,
the affidavit recited: "William Spinelli is known to this affiant and
to federal law enforcement agents and local law enforcement agents
as a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an
associate of gamblers."'13 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the credibility of an informant whose information
constituted the main element of the affidavit was not sufficiently
verified by the law enforcement officer's own observations. In its
decision the Court rejected the assertion that defendant was a
"known gambler" as having any probative value to establish an
independent basis for a finding of probable cause or to establish
the informant's credibility regarding his statements.14 In this light,
it is hard to agree with the Nebraska Supreme Court's acceptance
of the Omaha police officer's statement as a sufficient basis for a
finding of probable cause, because that information is even less
substantial than that rejected in Spinelli. Unlike the affidavit in
Spinelli, the Waits affidavit does not even describe the defendant
himself as a "known" user, but only his associates. 15
The Nebraska court recited verbatim the LeDent language describing the first half of the probable cause test which demands a
recital of the circumstances underlying the informant's belief as
to the location of the narcotics, and then made a literal application
to the facts in the Waits affidavit. Thus, the court would seem to be
sanctioning an unwarranted assumption as to the initial existence
of the illegally possessed article which does not occur in LeDent.
It is logical to assume that when the court found a sufficient recital
of circumstances forming a basis for the informant's conclusions
in the LeDent affidavit, 16 it considered those portions of the affidavit detailing the defendant's conversations with the informant.
The LeDent affidavit states that the defendant personally admitted
to the informer that he had marijuana in his possession and detailed
the description as to quantity and condition. 17 In contrast, there is
12 393 U.S. 410 (1968).

13 Id. at 414.
14 Id. at 418-19.
'5 See generally, Abrahams, Spinelli v. United States: Searching for
Probable Cause, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 735 (1969).
17 See, Mather, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or
Arrest, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 958 (1969). The author suggests that infor-

mation given by an informant may be of such extensive detail as to be
"self-verifying." See note 4, supra.
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no basis for establishing the existence of narcotics, the object of
the search, on the face of the Waits affidavit. It is doubtful that the
first sentence of the affidavit provides any such basis for it is only
a statement of affiant's conclusion that the defendant possessed
illicit drugs.
In Nathanson v. United States' s the Supreme Court declared
that "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly
issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find
probable cause therefore from facts or circumstances presented to
him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmation of belief or suspicion is not enough."'19 This rule was reinforced in Aguilar v.
Texas"0 where police presented an affidavit to obtain a search
warrant which read in part: "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin.., and
narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises ....21 Referring to both Nathanson and Giordenello v. United

States22 the Aguilar Court found that the "mere conclusion" "of an
informer, stating that the defendant possessed narcotics, was all
the more deplorable since it was not even the conclusion of the
afflant himself. The Court ruled that the search warrant should not
have issued. Thus, while Waits leaves intact the requirement
that the magistrate be informed of some of the circumstances that
form the basis of the informant's conclusions, it would seem that
after the Waits decision those circumstances need not include facts
indicating how the affiant came to the conclusion that the object
of his search in fact existed.
Finally, the nature of the information given by the postal inspector is subject to question with regard to its probative value in
Is290 U.S. 41 (1933). A warrant was issued upon the sworn allegation

that the affiant had cause to suspect and did believe that certain merchandise was in a specified location. The Court noted that the affidavit

went upon a mere affirmation of suspicion and belief without any
statement of adequate supporting facts.
19 Id. at 47. See also Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1957),
where the Court applied the Nathanson rule to an arrest warrant.
Affiant in that case swore that petitioner "did receive, conceal, etc.
narcotic drugs ... with knowledge of unlawful importation . . . "
The Court said that if the issuing authority was to act as a neutral and
detached magistrate, he must judge for himself the persuasiveness of
the facts relied upon by the complaining officer to show probable

cause. He should not accept without question the complainant's mere
conclusion.

39 U.S. 108 (1964).
Id. at 109.
22 See note 19 supra.
20
21
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the establishment of probable cause. While a comprehensive definition of what constitutes sufficient probable cause has never been
formulated by the Supreme Court, the Court established long ago
that probable cause could be found on less evidence than would be
necessary for a finding of guilt. 2 3 In Draper v. United States2 the
Court found that the terms "probable cause" and "reasonable
grounds" were substantially the same and in Brinegar v. United
States25 the Court noted: "In dealing with probable cause ... as
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. They are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act." 26 In recent decisions, however, the Court has taken
more of a restrictive view. In Beck v. Ohio27 two police officers
arrested the defendant without a warrant and upon searching his
person discovered certain gambling slips leading to his subsequent
conviction for violation of state gambling laws. In reversing the
conviction the Court said that a mere suspicion that the defendant
was conducting illegal gambling activities based on his past record
and other undisclosed "information" did not constitute sufficient
probable cause for a warrantless arrest.
Another aspect of Spinelli v. United States28 noted earlier,
merits consideration in view of the Nebraska Supreme Court's
finding of probable cause in the Waits affidavit. In their attempts
to substantiate an informant's "tip" that the defendant was a bookmaker, federal agents stated in the affidavit that the defendant was
seen on several occasions to drive his car into a parking lot behind
a certain apartment building where illegal gambling activity was
suspected. The affidavit further stated that the defendant was observed entering the suspect building and a particular apartment,
and that the telephone company records revealed that two telephones were installed in that apartment. While acknowledging
that Ventresca required a magistrate to render judgment based
upon a common-sense reading of the entire affidavit,29 the Spinelli
Court nevertheless rejected the government's contentions that such
apparently innocent activity taken in the totality of the circumstances amounted to probable cause.
23

24
25

26
27
28
29

Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
338 U.S. 160 (1949).
Id. at 175.
379 U.S. 89 (1964).
393 U.S. 410 (1968).
Id. at 415.
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An analysis of the information offered by the postal inspector
in the Waits affidavit reveals nothing more incriminating than the

kind of information rejected by the Spinelli Court. Virtually every
citizen regularly makes use of the United States mails in one

manner or another. Thousands of letters, packages and money
orders flow between California and Hawaii and other parts of the
country each day. In view of Spinelli, the fact that Waits received a
package from California and sent money orders on several past
occasions is of doubtful significance in justifying any finding of
probable cause to issue a search warrant.
While the opinion indicates that there may have been some reason for the package to arouse suspicion in the first place8 0 no
such reason is presented in the affidavit. It is therefore of no consequence that law enforcement officials might have had additional
grounds to present to the magistrate at the outset, for as the Supreme Court noted in Aguilar v. Texas.3 1 "It is elementary that in
passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may con3' 2
sider only information brought to the magistrate's attention."
In conclusion, it would seem that the Nebraska Supreme Court
has approved a search warrant affidavit containing less probative
information than the LeDent affidavit which, as was noted earlier,
the court found to only marginally comply with the minimum
standard that it had established. It may therefore be concluded
that the minimum standard of LeDent has in fact been further
relaxed.
30 185 Neb. at 781. 178 N.W.2d at 776.
31 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
32

Id. at 109, quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1957).
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WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA

In State v. Johnson- the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the
manslaughter conviction of the defendant. On appeal, the defendant
alleged that after a plea of guilty was accepted, he made a pro se
motion at the sentencing hearing to withdraw his plea. He contended, inter alia, that the trial court erred in overruling this
motion. The court, after reviewing the record, refused to interpret
the discussion at the sentencing hearing as a motion to withdraw
the plea of guilty. The court, in dicta, then noted:
In any event, however, in a situation such as this, a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty should be sustained only if the defendant proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice and defendant
must establish such grounds by clear and
convincing evidence. 2
Although this standard was set out in dicta, it nevertheless
is important in attempting to ascertain exactly what burden might,
in the future, be placed on a defendant who wants to withdraw a
plea of guilty. In that light, this review of Johnson will focus on
the relationship of this standard to previous Nebraska cases dealing
with plea withdrawal. In addition, this analysis will compare the
approach in Nebraska with the federal and A.B.A. approaches to
withdrawal of guilty pleas. 3
1. The Facts in Johnson.
In Johnson the defendant was originally charged with second
degree murder. After a jury was impaneled, but before trial began,
Johnson advised the court that he wished to plead guilty to a
charge of manslaughter pursuant to a plea bargain made with the
prosecution. The prosecutor in accordance amended the information and charged the defendant with manslaughter, to which the
defendant pleaded guilty. When Johnson appeared for arraignment on the amended information, he stated, "Well, I really want
to try it now."' 4 The court explained to the accused that if he went
to trial it would be for second degree murder rather than manslaughter. The court also explained the nature of the charge against
the defendant and what rights he would waive by pleading guilty.
The defendant then once again pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
1 187 Neb. 26, 187 N.W.2d 99 (1971).
2 Id. at 30, 187 N.W.2d at 101.

3 For a similar treatment of the law of Pennsylvania and Oklahoma see
75 DICK. L. REV. 608 (1970); Note, Plea Withdrawal in Oklahoma, 23
OKLA. L. REV.472 (1970).
4 187 Neb. at 27, 187 N.W.2d at 100.
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However, at the sentencing hearing another discussion took place
concerning the charge against the defendant and it was during
this discussion that the defendant made the alleged motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
After reviewing the record, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was attempting to abuse the plea bargaining process. The court reasoned that the defendant's efforts
were designed to get the second degree murder charge reduced to
manslaughter and then go to trial on the lesser charge. The court
also noted that prior to accepting the plea the trial court was assured by the prosecution that there was sufficient evidence to
prove Johnson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On the basis
of Alford v. North Carolina5 and State v. Turner6 the court found
the defendant's plea was voluntarily entered. Consequently, for
these reasons, the court refused to accept the defendant's contentions and affirmed the conviction.
2. The Nebraska Approach to Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas.
Although there are a number of states who have statutes dealing
with standards for plea withdrawal 7 Nebraska does not have such
a statute and any standards for plea withdrawal have been established by the court in the context of particular cases. In Nebraska
the ability of a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty has been
left to the discretion of the trial judge and if on appeal a defendant
is unable to show an abuse of that discretion, the decision of the
trial judge will not be reversed.8
In Jurgenson v. State9 the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized
the inherent problems in attempting to establish a general rule
r 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
6 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971). In Turner the court established
some guidelines for the acceptance of guilty pleas in Nebraska. Specificaly, the court held that an item by item review of constitutional
rights that are waived when a defendant pleads guilty is not required
before a court can accept a plea of guilty. The criterion is whether
the defendant understands the relevant factors involved in a guilty
plea. The court, quoting from Alford v. North Carolina, noted: "The
standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary
and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open
to the defendant." Id. at 427, 183 N.W.2d at 766.
7 See, e.g., GA. CODE Anx. § 27-1404 (1953); AID.R. Cram. P. 722; Mlxr.
STAT. § 630.29 (1947); PA. R. Cmvi P. 320.
8 Jurgenson v. State, 166 Neb. 111, 88 N.W.2d 129 (1958); Bordeau v.
State, 125 Neb. 133, 249 N.W. 291 (1933); Sandlovich v. State, 104 Neb.
169, 176 N.W. 81 (1920).
9 166 Neb. 111, 88 N.W.2d 129 (1958).
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for determining when a trial judge should permit a defendant to
withdraw a plea of guilty. The court noted, "The decision in each
case must depend to a great &xtent on the particular attendant
circumstances."' 10 However, the court adopted the following broad
standard to guide trial judges in deciding when to allow a withdrawal of a guilty plea:
Leave should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea of guilty
if it was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature
of the charge, through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through
fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation; was made involuntarily
for any reason; or even when it was entered inadvisedly, if any
reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury. If such a plea
has been received by the court without observance of the precautions and solemnities required by law, the court should permit the
plea to be withdrawn. On the other hand, if a defendant with
full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the
consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understandingly
and without fear or persuasion, the court may without abusing its
discretion, refuse to permit to withdraw it."
2
In State v. Pitze11
the court applied the Jurgenson standard and
reversed the decision of a trial judge who refused to allow the
defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty. Pitzel was charged with
abandonment of his wife and children on or about May 17, 1965.
The defendant, represented by a public defender, pleaded guilty
to that charge. Subsequently, after new counsel had been retained,
Pitzel made two separate motions to withdraw his plea; both motions were denied by the trial court. On appeal the court noted that
from November 28, 1962, to January 20, 1966, there was a divorce
proceeding pending against the defendant and that a restraining
order obtained by his wife was in force against him during this
period. The court recognized that under terms of the restraining
13
order the defendant could not possibly be guilty of abandonment.
Consequently, the court reversed the trial court and remanded
the case with directions to allow the defendant to enter a plea of
not guilty, after which the case was to be dismissed. Although
basing its decision on the Jurgenson standard, the court did not
explain on which part of the standard it relied in reaching its
result.

In State v. Journey'4 the court reversed the decision of the trial
judge who refused to allow the defendant to withdraw a plea of
10 Id.at 118, 88 N.W.2d at 133.

11 Id. at 119, 88 N.W.2d at 133-34.
12 181 Neb. 176, 147 N.W.2d 524 (1966).
's Id. at 181, 147 N.W.2d at 528.
14 186 Neb. 556, 184 N.W.2d 616 (1971).
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guilty for failure to make child support payments. The alleged
failure of payments occured in May 1966, but the complaint was not
filed until June 1969. However, there was a general statute of
limitations of three years.1 5 The defendant requested counsel prior
to sentencing but that request was denied. 16 The court quoted
the Jurgenson standard, relied on the particular facts in the case,
17
and concluded that the plea of guilty may have been "inadvisable."'
The court further noted that the failure to furnish counsel prejudicially affected the right of the defendant to move for a withdrawal.
In these two cases the court allowed withdrawal of the guilty
pleas when the record disclosed that the defendant was either not

guilty of the charge or that because of lack of counsel, he had a
valid but unused defense. Absent such a showing, however, the
court has been loathe to allow withdrawal once it has been denied
by the trial court. It also appears that the court will not allow a
withdrawal when there is a strong probability of the defendant's

guilt or the particular record of the defendant indicates a prior
criminal record.

For example, in State v. Eutzy 8 the defendant, prior to sentencing, attempted to withdraw a plea of nolo contendere to a
charge of issuing a "no-account" check with intent to defraud. He
asserted that he did not understand his previous plea and had
thought that he would not receive a sentence of more than six
months. The court found, upon an examination of the record, that

the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily and understandingly
entered his plea. The court noted:
A mere change of mind after the completion of a pre-sentence
investigation does not warrant a change of procedure and a new
trial at the whim of a defendant who acted with full knowledge
of the import and consequences of his plea, particularly when it
was done with the assistance of competent legal counsel.19
As for a possible standard to be followed by the trial court in
allowing the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere the
court noted in a syllabus that: "A plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
made with full knowledge of the charge and consequences of the
15 NEB. Ray. STAT. § 29-110 (Supp. 1969).
18 In an earlier opinion of the same case, State v. Journey, 186 Neb. 416,
183 N.W.2d 494 (1971), the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the
conviction for failure to furnish counsel.
17 186 Neb. at 558, 184 N.W.2d at 617.
18 184 Neb. 755, 172 N.W.2d 94 (1969).
19 Id. at 757, 172 N.W.2d at 95-96.
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plea, will not be permitted to be withdrawn in the absence of
fraud,
'20
mistake or other improper means used in its procurement.
In its opinion the court noted that between the time Eutzy pleaded
guilty and the time he attempted to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing, he had to forfeit his bail for failure to appear at
a hearing. The reason that the defendant had failed to appear
was that at the time of the previous hearing he was incarcerated
under a conviction of petit larceny.
It is also worthy of note that in a short concurring opinion
Judges Smith and McCown voted to affirm, without explanation, on
21
the basis of the A.B.A. Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty.
3. The Federal Approach.
In contrast to Nebraska, which does not distinguish between
the propriety of withdrawal of guilty pleas before or after sentencing, the federal courts do make this distinction. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence
is suspended; but to correct a manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment
of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw his plea.2 2
Although the rule states that withdrawal after sentence should be
permitted only to correct a "manifest injustice," it does not establish any standard relating to withdrawal of guilty pleas prior to
the imposition of the sentence. Despite this fact, many federal courts
have enunciated the rule that withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to
'23
sentencing should be "freely allowed.
The rationale of this distinction and of the different standards
24
was articulated in Kadwell v. United States:
20

Id. at 755, 172 N.W.2d at 94. In a similar case, State v. Cunningham,

21

refused to allow the defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty to automobile theft. In its decision the court noted that after the plea of
guilty, but before the sentencing hearing and the motion to withdraw
the plea was made, the defendant was involved in a second robbery.
184 Neb. at 757, 172 N.W.2d at 96.

185 Neb. 488, 176 N.W.2d 732 (1970), the court, citing this standard,

23

FED. R. CRnv. P. 32 (d).
E.g., United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970); United

24

States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1969); Poole v. United States,
250 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963).

22
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This distinction rests upon practical considerations important to
the proper administration of justice. Before sentencing, the inconvenience to court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea
is ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of
guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused
might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential
punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. The result would be to undermine respect for the
courts and fritter away25the time and painstaking effort devoted to
the sentencing process.
In United States v. Stayton26 the court discussed the discretion of a trial judge in ruling on a motioi to withdraw a plea
of guilty and noted that, "The motion to withdraw a guilty plea
protects the rights of an accused to trial. Therefore such requests
made before sentencing should be construed liberally in favor of
27
the accused by the trial courts.
The court in Stayton also pointed out that the standard for
withdrawal prior to sentence is "fairness and justice." 28 This
standard was originally promulgated by way of dicta in Kercheval
v. United States29 and although it was decided before Rule 32(d)
was adopted it continues as the current federal standard with
respect to pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. 0
Although the federal courts have held that a pre-sentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be considered with liberality, they have recognized that a defendant has no absolute right
of withrawal. It is generally conceded that withdrawal rests with
the sound discretion of the trial court.31 One ground that the federal courts have recognized as sufficient to deny withdrawal is extreme prejudice to the state's case.3 2 One writer has gone further
25

Id. at 670.

26

408 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1969).

27

Id. at 560.

28 Id. at 561.
29 274 U.S. 220 (1927). In the case the court stated:" The court in the
exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea
of not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the
privilege seems fair and just." Id. at 224.
30 E.g., Dorton v. United States, 447 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970).
31 See Dorton v. United States, 447 F.2d 401, 404 (10th Cir. 1971), and
the cases cited therein.
.32 United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1969); Farnsworth v.
Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940). In Farnsworth, after the defendant had pleaded guilty, the government dismissed over fifty witnesses subpoenaed from throughout the country.. When the defendant
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and suggested that a defendant should have an absolute right to
pre-sentence withdrawal absent a showing by the prosecution of
substantial prejudice to its case. 33
After sentencing, the Federal Rules indicate a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
should be allowed only upon a showing of
"manifest injustice."3 4 In attempting to ascertain what constitutes
manifest injustice, the courts have taken various approachs. One
court has stated that post sentence withdrawal is permissible only
in "extraordinary cases."3 5 Another court, while not expressly defining manifest injustice, noted that the concept gives the judge
a greater latitude and places a lighter burden on the defendant than
he must bear to demonstrate a violation of constitutional due
process that is prerequisite to a successful motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.386 Yet another federal court has determined
that a court should allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty
based on the manifest injustice standard:
[I]f it was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the
nature of the charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect;
through fear, fraud or official misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for any reason; or even when it was entered inadvisedly,
if any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury. 7
4. The A.B.A. Approach.
In addition to the federal standards relating to withdrawal of
guilty pleas, the American Bar Association Project on Minimum
attempted to withdraw his plea, the government was unable to locate
many of the witnesses. The court refused to allow the defendant to
withdraw his plea in the face of this showing of prejudice to the
government.
33 Note, Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in Federal Courts, 40

N.Y.U.L. REv. 759, 769 (1965).
35 United States v. Roland, 318 F.2d 406, 409 (4th Cir. 1963).

84 FED. R. Cina. P. 32(d).
386 Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 1963). 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1970) is the post conviction relief statute for federal prisoners.
Under the statute, a prisoner in federal custody may petition a federal
court to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence imposed upon him if
it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or the sentence was in excess of the maximum allowed by law,
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
37 United States v. Lias, 173 F.2d 685, 688 (4th Cir. 1949). It is interesting
to note that this is the same standard for plea withdrawal that the
Nebraska Supreme Court adopted in Jurgenson v. State, 166 Neb. 111,
88 N.W.2d 129 (1958). Thus, at least one federal court would agree
with the Jurgenson standard with respect to the stricter standards
for post sentence withdrawal
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Standards for Criminal Justice has formulated standards for withdrawal of guilty pleas. Although the two sets of standards are
similar, 38 there are some differences. The A.B.A. Minimum Standards distinguish between the ability of the defendant to withdraw his plea as a matter of right3 9 and as a matter of judicial
discretion. o
In order to withdraw a plea of guilty as a matter of right the
defendant must, upon a timely motion, prove that withdrawal is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. 41 A motion is "timely" if
made with due diligence and is not necessarily barred if made after
judgment or sentence.42 The A.B.A. Standards also define manifest
injustice:
Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the defendant proves that:

(1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed
to him by constitution, statute or rule;
(2) that the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant
or a person authorized to so act in his behalf;
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge
of the charge or that the sentence actually imposed could be"
imposed;
(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concession comtemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney
failed to seek or not to oppose these concessions as promised in the
plea agreement; or
(5) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement concurred in by the court, and he
did not affirm his plea after being advised that the court no longer
concurred
and being called upon to either affirm or withdraw his
43
plea.

The A.B.A. Standards also provide that prior to sentence the
trial court in its discretion may allow withdrawal for any fair
and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced. 44
38

39

Compare, FED. R. Cum. P. 32 (d) and A.B.A. MDnnrmm
STAxDAI~s PoR
CRIMINAL JusuIcE, PLEAS OF GuILTY § 2.1 (Approved Draft 1968).
A.B.A. rNnnvr STANARDS FoR CRMINAL JusTIcE, PLEAS OF GuSTY

§§ 2.1(a) and (b) (Approved Draft 1968).

§ 2.1(b).
41 Id. § 2.1(a).
42 Id. § 2.1 (a) (i).
40 Id.

43

Id. § 2.1 (a) (ii). The comments to this section provide that the defendant should furnish proof of manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence. Compare, § 2.1 and accompanying comments with

the standard the Nebraska Supreme Court sets forth in Johnson. It is
apparent that the court adopted its standard from the A.B.A. STAN-"
DARDS.
44

Id. § 2.1(b). But see Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.
1940).
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Thus, the standard for withdrawal as a matter of right is manifest
injustice while withdrawal as a matter of discretion is to be granted
for any fair and just reason. After sentence is imposed the standard
that the trial court is to use for both is manifest injustice.
5. Comparison of Various Approaches.
Reading the Eutzy and Johnson cases it seems clear that the
ebraska Supreme Court is leaning toward adoption of the A.B.A.
Standards.However, should the court adopt the A.B.A. Standards it
should specify that it is doing so and it should specify what parts
of the standards are being adopted. In addition, the court should
be aware of the distinctions in the standards between withdrawal
as a matter of right and withdrawal addressed to the court's discretion.
If Johnson's purported motion were interpreted as a motion
for withdrawal as a matter of right, the standard the court in
Johnson adopts in dicta is in keeping with the A.B.A. Standards.
Johnsonis not consonant with the A.B.A. Standardsif the purported
motion were interpreted as one addressed to the trial court's discretion.
In this area, there are several distinctions that have been made
which relate to the burden that a defendant who wishes to withdraw his plea of guilty must meet. First, the federal courts apply
different standards dependent on whether the motion was made
before or after sentence was imposed. Second, the A.B.A. Standards would also apply different standards dependent on whether
the motion was made as a matter of right or addressed to judicial
discretion. Third, there is a different standard which governs a
trial court in contrast to an appellate court. These distinctions
and the various approaches taken are summarized in the following
chart:
Standards For Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas

Nebraska
Federal
Courts
A.B.A.
Standards

Trial Court
Post-sentence
Pre-sentence
Manifest
Manifest
Injustice
Injustice
Manifest
Fair and
Injustice
Just Reason
Fair and
Manifest
Injustice
Just Reason
(At the court's
(At the court's
discretion)
discretion)

Appellate Court
Abuse of
Discretion
Abuse of
Discretion
Abuse of
Discretion
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Manifest
Injustice
(As a matter
of right)

Manifest
Injustice
(As a matter
of right)

Abuse of
Discretion

To date, the Nebraska Supreme Court has addressed itself only
to this third area and recognizes that whatever standard governs
the trial court, the question on review is whether the lower court
abused its discretion within that standard. The court has neither
addressed itself to the different standards for pre-sentence and postsentence withdrawal nor to the different standards for withdrawal
as a matter of right and withdrawal as a matter of judicial discretion.
It is impossible to tell whether the court has been aware of
these distinctions and has rejected them or whether the court has
not been cognizant of these distinctions. At this point all that can
confidently be said is that the Nebraska Supreme Court has taken a
stricter stand than many courts in allowing a defendant, prior to
sentencing, to withdraw a plea of guilty.
Hopefully, in the future, the court will recognize that these
distinctions exist and will address itself to the problem in order
to insure that a defendant will not unnecessarily
and without good
reason to deprived of his right to trial.45
45 Since the decision in Johnson, the court has decided two other cases

relating to the withdrawal of guilty pleas. In State v. Krug, 187 Neb.
554, 192 N.W.2d 163 (1971), the court refused to allow the defendant
to withdraw his plea of guilty. On appeal, the defendant alleged that
the prosecutor had failed to keep his part of the plea bargain. However, the court refused to accept Krug's contention and said that he
had the burden to show that a bargain had been made and that it had
been broken. Since Krug was unable to prove this to the court's satisfaction, his conviction was affirmed. In State v. Kimes, 188 Neb. 85,
195 N.W.2d 216 (1972), the prosecutor had promised to recommend a
forty year sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty. However, he
recommended a fifty year sentence and the defendant received a forty
year sentence. The court reversed the conviction on the basis of Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), since the prosecutor had failed
to keep his part of the bargain.
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III. PROPERTY

A.

RESTRANT ON ALIENATION

In the case of Cast v. National Bank of Commerce Trust and

Savings Association,1 the Nebraska Supreme Court on rehearing reiterated the well known doctrine that any direct restraint upon the
alienation of a fee simple is invalid regardless of its reasonableness.2 Moreover, the court held that restraints which affect the
marketability of property, and thus its alienability as a practical
matter, are indirect restraints which are invalid regardless of the
reasonableness of the restraints.3
A brief examination of the history of the validity of restraints
upon alienation will be necessary before discussing the facts and
analyzing the future impact of the Cast case. As the English feudal
system disappeared the holder of a fee simple became able to
alienate his estate.4 And as the need to transfer land increased the
concept developed that land should not be unduly controlled by
a "dead hand." 5 As a result of this concept the majority of authority
has held that even limited and reasonable restraints on the alienation of a fee simple are void since they are contrary to the nature
of the interest.6 However, a small number of states "departed from

1 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971).
2 Id. at 387, 183 N.W.2d at 488. This doctrine was originally set forth in
Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953).
a The court stated that, "[a] condition attached to a fee simple estate,
otherwise valid, must be reasonable and not materially affect its marketability. If it materally affects marketability adversely, it is an
indirect restraint against alienation. . . . A majority of this court,
including the writer, has come to the conclusion that the law is the
same on direct and indirect restraints of alienation." 186 Neb. at 391,
163 N.W.2d at 489-90.
4 L. Sn ns & A. SMTH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTEmRSTs § 1134 (2d ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as SImEs & SMITH].
5 The desire to prevent dead hand controls is one of the reasons for
the development of the rules voiding restraints on alienation. Some
of the other reasons are the obstruction of commerce and productivity,
the concentration of wealth, and the abuse of creditors. Bernhart,
The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation,
57 MicH. L. REv. 1173 (1959).
6 Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 P. 118 (1883); Bonnell v. McLaughlin,
173 Cal. 213, 159 P. 590 (1916). But cf. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61
Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), where a covenant
in a mortgage that the property would not be sold or encumbered was
held not to be an invalid restraint on alienation. See also Comment,
Coast Bank v. Minderhout and the Reasonable Restraint on Alienation:
Creature of Commercial Ambiguity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 954 (1965).
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the general rule by holding that such limited restraints, calling for
forfeiture of the fee, are valid if they are reasonable."'7
Prior to 1929 the Nebraska Supreme Court, although upholding
restraints on alienation of interests less than a fee simple,8 would
not allow such restraints to be placed upon a fee simple., At that
time if a testator attempted to grant a fee simple and then attempted to attach subsequent provisions which restrained its alienability, the subsequent provision would be held not to have affected
the fee. However, such provisions could be used to determine what
type of fee was being devised.10
In 1929 the Nebraska Supreme Court in Peters v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co." held that conditions subsequent which are
attached to a fee simple are enforcible, if reasonable.' 2 In that
case the court felt that the advancing trend toward liberal construction of wills to meet the intent of the testator, as exemplified
by "intent statutes,"' 3 had relaxed the rules concerning the per7 52 Mic. L. REv. 616, 617 (1954). For a discussion of the minority and

majority rules see Snvxss & SMTH, supra note 4, at §§ 1149-50; Annot.,
67 A.L.R. 1319 (1930); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1955); Bernhart, supra
note 5. Bernhart states that the majority rule is simply "that all restraints on alienation are void, unless they fall into recognized exception categories." Id. at 1174. Some of the exceptions are spendthrift
trusts, restraints of the power to partition, restraints on alienation to a
small group of persons where the group classifications are not defiined
by race or other social characteristics, forfeiture restraints on life or
lesser estates, and restraints applied to gifts of charity. The author
points out that the minority rule allowing reasonable restraints is more
flexible and thus allows the court to weigh the true interests of the
parties, whereas the majority rule is less flexible allowing only certain
exceptions.
8 Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899), the court held
that a condition providing that property devised to the trustee for
years could not be alienated or incumbered by the beneficiary during
that time, was not invalid. Likewise, in Albin v. Parmele, 70 Neb. 740,
98 N.W. 29 (1904), the court upheld such a restraint upon a life
estate.
9 The court said in Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Neb. 66, 122 N.W. 707 (1909),
that a fee simple once devised could not be restrained by conditions
subsequent in the will And in Moffitt v. Williams, 116 Neb. 785, 219
N.W. 138 (1928), the court held that when the grantor passes the fee
he loses control of it.
10 Grant v. Hover, 103 Neb. 730, 174 N.W. 317 (1919).
1 119 Neb. 161, 227 N.W. 917 (1929). This case concerned a ten year
restriction against alienation which was placed upon a fee simple.
12 Id. at 168-69, 227 N.W. at 920.
13 Nm. Com. STAT. § 5594 (1922)

was the intent statute at that time

and is similar to today's intent statute, Nim. REv. STAT. § 76-205 (Reissue 1971).
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missibility of restraints on fee simples. 14 The court then allowed
a ten year restraint on alienation to be valid. 15
In 1953 the rule changed again when the court in Andrews v.
Hall16 said:
We do not agree that there has been a judicial relaxation of rules
governing the creation and vesting of fee simple estates. The validity or extent of one's title to real estate ought not to rest upon
17
considerations of reasonableness in the imposing of restrictions.
The court pointed out that, as the right to convey or encumber
a fee simple is one of its primary incidents of ownership, a testator
should not be allowed to create a fee simple estate to vest at his
death and at the same time restrict its alienation by a condition
subsequent.' 8 With the Andrews decision Nebraska joined a large
number of states that had voided direct restraints on alienation
of a vested fee simple, regardless of whether the restraints were
reasonable or whether the restraints comported with the intent
of the testator. 19
With this brief summary of the prior law on restraints against
alienation of estates in fee simple in mind, the rationale of the
The court said: "There is no doubt that the ancient rule against restrictions on alienation of a fee simple title has been much relaxed by
the modern trend of interpretation of wills and deeds; and under a
statute such as ours, the intent of the testator is the imperative guide
unless inconsistent with the rules of law." 119 Neb. at 167, 227 N.W.
at 920.
15 The court reasoned that since the restraint reflected the intent of the
testator and was not unreasonable or unlimited in duration the court
should give it effect. Id. at 169, 227 N.W. at 920.
16 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953).
17 Id. at 821, 58 N.W.2d at 203. In this case Hall received a fee simple
interest in some property from his father with the restriction that if
an attempt at alienation was made before the death of his father's
wife, the share would be forfeited. The court held that the intent
statute "relates only to rules of construction and does not enlarge
or limit, or in any way modify, any rule of substantive law that
exisited at the time of its passage or that thereafter has been
created." Id. at 820, 58 N.W.2d at 203. The court had previously announced this doctrine in Stuehm v. Mkulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W.2d
595 (1941).
18 Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 821, 58 N.W.2d 201, 203 (1953). The
court went on to say: "We do not say that a testator may not create
a vested fee simple estate subject to a condition subsequent or a
determinable or defeasible fee. What we do say is that a restriction
against alienation of a vested fee simple estate is not any one of these,
nor, since it is void, can it be used as the sole basis for the creation
of any of these estates." Id.
19 52 M cH. L. REv. 616 (1954).
14
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Cast decision and its future impact on this area of the law will
be discussed.
The beneficiary, Richard Cast, brought an action against the
defendant bank, executor and residuary trustee of the estate of
Cast's uncle, William J. Webermeier.2 0 The plaintiff sought the
court's construction of the will in regard to two of its provisions.
The will gave Webermeier's share in a tract of land held in cotenancy to Cast. However, the provisions in question required Cast,
or a member of his family, to live upon the land for a period of
twenty-five years, and within one year of the testator's death to add
the name "Webermeier" to his legal name.21 The plaintiff beneficiary
claimed that these two provisions of the will were invalid as being
both impossible and against the law and policy of the state regard22
ing the alienation of fee simple estates.
The trial court agreed with the beneficiary's contention and
held that the provisions were void.23 The defendant executor appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which in its first opinion
rejected the district court's holding that the beneficiary received
a vested fee simple absolute. 24 The supreme court felt that Cast
20

21

22
23
24

185 Neb. at 359, 176 N.W.2d at 32.
The will gave Cast all right, title, and interest of which Webermeier
was seized at the time of his death, subject to the provisions that:
"A. The said Richard Cast or one of his children shall, within a
period of one year after my death, move to and occupy said farm as
his or her residence and domicile, and continuously maintain the
same thereon for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
"B. The member of the Richard Cast family so occupying said real
estate shall, within a period of one year after my death, by appropriate legal action, add the name 'Webermeier' to his or her legal
name." Id. at 360, 176 N.W.2d at 32. The will provided that if the
conditions were not met the title would revert to the residuary
legatee.
Id. at 362, 176 N.W.2d at 33.
Id. at 360, 176 N.W.2d at 32.
The district court had held that the provision requiring the beneficiary to occupy the property for 25 years was a condition subsequent which failed because it was an impossible condition. Since the
testator was a tenant in common and could not restrict the use of
the property by the other tenant in common, such a provision was
beyond the testator's power and therefore the beneficiary received
the property free of such restraint as a fee simple absolute. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the condition was not impossible as
the will merely required Cast or a member of his family to live on
the land and not to take exclusive possession of it. Id. at 364, 176
N.W.2d at 34.
The rights of tenants in common are discussed in 86 C.J.S., Tenancy
in Common § 25 (1954), and Annot., 124 A.L.R. 222 (1940). The ability
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had received a lesser interest.25 Thus the Andrews doctrine would
not be applicable26 since the interest could be a determinable, qualified, or base fee.

Judge Carter went further in a concurring opinion distinquishing
direct and indirect restraints with regard to the rule of Andrews v.
Hall.2 The Judge said that since these restraints were incidental
to the conditions subsequent, they 28were indirect restraints and
not subject to the Andrews doctrine.
In the first Cast opinion, the Nebraska court emphasized the
intent of the testator and felt that according to the "intent statute"29
the court should interpret the will in the manner which would best
express the testator's intent as shown from the will.3 0 The court

pointed out that a testator may dispose of his property in any way
he wishes and the courts are bound to enforce that intent, provided
of a co-tenant to restrict the alienation of the other co-tenant's share
is discussed in 54 HAY.L. REv. 1081 (1941).
25 Judge Spencer, writing for the majority in the first opinion stated
that the provisions were more in the nature of a fee subject to a
conditional limitation than a condition subsequent. 185 Neb. at 367, 176
N.W.2d at 35. For the distinction and rules regarding the two interests
see 2 WAsHBm ON REAL PROPERTY § 1640 (6th ed. 1902).
26 185 Neb. at 368, 176 N.W.2d at 36. See Ohm v. Clear Creek Drainage
Dist., 153 Neb. 428, 45 N.W.2d 117 (1950); 28 Am. Jura. 2D Estates § 22
(1966). These interests were not prohibited by Andrews v. Hall but
rather were distinquished from a vested fee simple. See note 17, supra.
27 Judge Carter had written the opinion in Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb.
817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953).
28 185 Neb. at 379, 176 N.W.2d at 42. The distinction between direct and
indirect restraints is: "A direct restraint on alienation is a provision
in a deed, will, contract, or other instrument which, by its express
terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the
exercise of the power of alienation.... An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose
other than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental result
that the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical alienability....
Ordinarily an indirect restraint does not restrict the power of alienation
but only the fact of alienability." SIMES

&

SmTim, supra note 4, at

§ 1112.
'9The current statute reads: "In the construction of every instrument
creating or conveying, or authorizing or requiring the creation or
conveyance of any real estate, or interest therein, it shall be the duty
of the courts of justice to carry into effect the true intent of the
parties so far as such intent can be collected from the whole instrument, and so far as such intent is consistent with the rules of law."
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-205 (Reissue 1971).
30 185 Neb. at 365, 176 N.W.2d at 34.
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the testator does not violate public policy or a statute.8 ' It stated
that the validity of the addition of a name requirement had previously been approved by the court 2 and that the validity of the
twenty-five year residency provision was well established.3
Chief Justice White dissented saying that the beneficiary, Cast,
0 4
Thus the
had received a fee simple subject to the Andrews rule.
provisions were "clearly void and of no effect whatsoever because
it constitutes an illegal restraint on alienation. '85 The Chief Justice
also argued that it was not important whether the restraint was
direct or indirect. The proper determination was said to hinge upon
the effect the restraint had upon the owner's ability to dispose of
the property. 6 In addition, the dissent dismissed the intent of the
testator as a factor, saying that intent was irrelevant since the
Nebraska Supreme Court had "firmly committed itself to the docproperty when opposed to the
trine of freedom of alienation of 37
unrestrained intent of the testator.
81 Id. The court had earlier stated: "A testator had a right to dispose of

of his property in any manner he sees fit and to attach any conditions
to its possession and enjoyment, provided no positive rule of law or
public policy is infringed; and, as before stated, it is the duty of the
courts to enforce the will of the testator, under the above limitations,
in accordance with his intention as expressed by the words used."
In re Estate of Smith, 117 Neb. 776, 786, 223 N.W. 17, 21 (1929).
32 Smith v. Smith, 64 Neb. 563, 90 N.W. 560 (1902), wherein a change of
name provision was upheld as a reasonable restraint.
3 "The validity of a requirement that the beneficiary must reside on
certain premises is well established." 185 Neb. at 363, 176 N.W.2d at
34. The court cited Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 387, 391 (1954): "Conditions
of this type [personal occupancy] are valid when imposed upon a life
estate, or a term of years, since these interests usually may be subjected to a forefeiture restraint. Where the condition of personal occupany is imposed upon a fee interest, it should be void, and this
view has apparently been approved in the few cases in which the
problem has arisen." 6 AiEncAw LAW OF PROPERTY, § 26.69 (1952).
34 " 'A restraint in alienation in the form of a condition subsequent, forfeiting or terminating the fee simple estate, or providing for a limitation over upon breach of the condition is, void."' 185 Neb. at 371, 176
N.W.2d at 38 (Emphasis by the Chief Justice). The Chief Justice was
quoting from Andrews v. Hall.
85 Id. at 370, 176 N.W.2d at 37.
36 Id. 377, 176 N.W.2d at 40-41.
87 Id. at 371, 176 N.W.2d at 37. The dissent was referring to Andrews
Hall, where the court, while speaking of the intent statute, said:
"We have held that it relates only to rules of construction and does
not enlarge or limit, or an any way modify, any rule of substantive
law that existed at the time of its passage or that thereafter has been
created .... "The general rule that restrictions against alienation of
real estate vested in fee simple are against public poliey and void
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On rehearing, the court reversed itself and held that the conditions of the will were invalid since they were restraints upon the
practical alienation of the property. 38 The court held that the provisions were conditions subsequent to a fee simple title, and since
they provided for a forfeiture or reverter or limitation over upon
breach, they were void. 39 The court held that the residency clause
was void since the provision was a restraint on alienation, because
as a practical matter Cast could not transfer the land and still reside
on it. Thus the court adopted the theory of the Chief Justice's dissent to the court's first opinion of the case, that is, a fee simple
required the power to alienate in the practical sense rather than
just in the theoretical.

40

The court went on to invalidate the provision requiring the
beneficiary to change his name. In doing so, the court overruled
its former decision of Smith v. Smith 4' in which the court had held
that a requirement to change one's name was a reasonable restraint. In overruling Smith the court indicated that it was opposed
to giving effect to a testator's whimsy at the expense of a fee simple
title.42 The court felt that a restraint on a fee simple must not only
be reasonable, but must also not affect the fee's alienability from a

is a rule of substantive law which remains unaffected by the intent
statute. 156 Neb. 817, 820, 58 N.W.2d, 201, 203 (1953).
8 186 Neb. at 391, 183 N.W.2d at 490.
39 Id. at 387-89, 183 N.W.2d at 488. The court pointed out that this was

the general rule announced by most courts. The court also pointed
out that the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY invalidated such forfeiture restraints on a fee simple: "Where an owner of land in fee simple absolute makes an otherwise effective devise thereof to a named devisee
and his heirs but if such devisee or his heirs during a fixed term of
years attempt to transfer the land by any means, the land shall go
over to another, the forfeiture restraint qualified only as to time is
invalid. The first devisee has an indefeasible estate in fee simple."
Id. at 389, 183 N.W. 2d at 488, 489. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 406, Illustrations 1 and 2, at 2397-98 (1944).
40 186 Neb. at 391, 183 N.W.2d at 490.
41 64 Neb. 563, 90 N.W. 560 (1902).
42 "It seems to us that a condition attached to a fee simple title which
has for its purpose the satisfaction of a whimsical obsession or an
expression of testator's vanity ought not be permitted as a fettering
of a fee simple title. Such a condition is unreasonable in that fee
titles to real estate are not proper places for trivial conditions evidencing personal whimsy ....

Where a grantor or testator grants or

devises a fee simple title, he is not permitted to fetter the title that
he created with inconsequential and unreasonable conditions otherwise
valid." 185 Neb. at 390, 183 N.W.2d at 489.
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practical standpoint.4 3 The court held that a restraint which adversely affects the marketability of the property also restrains the
alienability of the property as a practical matter, and thus, is an
invalid indirect restraint.44
Judge Spencer dissented, stating his belief that the devise was
not a fee simple and even if it was, the restraints were indirect as
to alienability and thus not invalidated by Andrews.4 5 With regard
to the issue of the validity of indirect restraints, Judge Spencer was
joined in dissent by Judge Boslaugh, who pointed out that as a
general rule some indirect restraints are valid.4 6 While Andrews v.
Hall held that direct restraints against alienation of fee simple
interests were invalid regardless of their reasonableness, it was
generally accepted that indirect restraints would be allowed if
reasonable and limited in duration of time so as to comply with
the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 7
The importance of the Cast decision relates to the court's attitude
toward the validity of indirect restraints. 48 Once the court had de"A condition attached to a fee simple estate, otherwise valid, must
be reasonable and not materially affect its marketability. If it materially affects marketability adversely, it is an indirect restraint
against alienation." Id. at 391, 183 N.W.2d at 490. The court then announced that it would adopt as the proper statement of the law that:
"the expression 'restraint on alienation' refers not merely to the restriction of the legal power of alienation, but also to the restriction of
alienability as a practical matter. Any provision in a deed, will, contract, or other legal instrument which, if valid, would tend to impair
the marketability of property, is a restraint on alienation.... In brief,
the law is concerned primarily with practical alienability, not with a
theortical power of alienation." Id. at 391, 183 N.W.2d at 490. The court
was quoting from SnviEs & SrmTH §§ 1111, 1115.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 394, 183 N.W.2d at 491.
46 Id. at 396, 183 N.W.2d at 492. Judge Boslaugh cited as authority
Snvms &SMr, supra note 4, at §§ 1112, 1115, 1116.
47 "If the restraint is direct, it may be bad regardless of the length of
time it is to last. On the other hand, if the restraint is indirect, it will
invariably be valid if it is to terminate within a life or lives in
being and twenty-one years beyond; but if it is to last longer than
that period, the indirect restraint may be bad." Id. at 397, 183 N.W.2d
43

at 492, 493. See also S mEs & SMITH, supra note 4, at § 1115.
48

The court seems to be saying restraints which are not direct restraints
on alienation but operate to restrict alienation as a practical matter
are indirect restraints and that indirect restraints are invalid. The
question arises whether those restraints which incidently affect alienability but do not affect marketability are still indirect restraints or
something else, and, if not something else, does the test of reasonableness still apply to them?
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cided that the beneficiary had received a fee simple estate, it could
have found the twenty-five year residency requirement invalid as
a direct restraint on alienation for a fixed number of years. The
court could also have held that the name addition provision was
invalid as being whimsical and against public policy. Instead, using
the test of the effect on marketability, the court declared the provisions to be indirect restraints. Rather than applying the test of
reasonableness, the court 49held that indirect restraints were as
invalid as direct restraints.
Generally an indirect restraint is examined to determine if it
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. 50 Furthermore, the provisions must normally pass the test of reasonableness. When determining the issue of reasonableness the following questions are often
asked: whether the one imposing the restraint has some interest
in the land which he is seeking to protect, whether the duration of
the restraint is too long, and whether the restraint accomplished a
worthwhile purpose. 51 If the restraint is capricious it is an indication
that the restraint is unreasonable and invalid. However:
[E]ach case must be thoroughly examined in the light of all the
circumstances to determine whether the objective sought to be
accomplished by the restraint is worth attaining at the cost of
interfering with the freedom of alienation or to determine
whether the particular
52 interference with alienability is so slight
as not to be material.
In this particular case it would be hard to search for a worthwhile objective of the two provisions. The court expresses its
feeling that a provision requiring the addition of a name is pure
whimsy and that such capriciousness should not interfer with the
ability of the devisee to alienate the property given to him in fee
simple. 53 Thus the court would not hold that the provision was for
a worth-while purpose. With regard to the provision requiring occupation of the property for twenty-five years the dissent in the first

186 Neb. at 391, 183 N.W.2d at 490.
Snims & SMTH § 1116. However, the court dismisses the relevancy
of the Rule Against Perpetuities in this case by saying: "We have
serious doubts if the Rule Against Perpetuities is of controlling importance in a case where a fee title has been created by a testator on
his death subject to conditions subsequent which, directly or indirectly, prevent the alienability of the land constituting the subject
of the devise." Id. at 392,, 183 N.W.2d at 490.
51 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406, at 2407 (1944).
52 Id. at 2407-08.
53 186 Neb. at 390, 183 N.W.2d at 489.

49

50
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opinion had pointed out that one of the reasons for rules against
alienation was to prevent land being tied up.54 To require occupation
of property for twenty-five years would undoubtedly tie up the
property.
The weakness of the Cast decision is that the court has passed
over a test which would allow a judicial determination of the
factors and circumstances of each case and has instead adopted
a test which applies the arbitrary guidelines of marketability to
an inflexible rule regarding indirect restraints. 55 An example of this
weakness can be shown by comparing the reasonableness test and
marketability test in two hypothetical cases. For example, B wishes
to buy land from A, who wishes to insure the land will be used
for a particular purpose such as drainage, diking, or ditching.56 In
applying the marketability test of the Cast decision the court would
decide whether the condition limiting the use of the land for that
purpose adversely affected the marketability and thus the alienability of the property. After making that decision the court would
apply the Cast rule and find that the condition was an indirect restraint and thus invalid. However, by applying the more conventional test of reasonableness the court could weigh the advantages
of the provisions against the threat of restraining indirectly the
alienation of the property.
Consider further the case where A and B are co-tenants. Both
wish to avoid the imposition of a stranger into the co-tenancy; thus
they create a covenant in which they agree to first offer the property to the other co-tenant. Because of the delay due to the exercise
of the option the marketability of the property is affected. With
the reasonableness test the court could weigh the social value of
the covenant against the amount of restraint on alienation. 57 Of
54
55

185 Neb. at 374, 176 N.W.2d at 39.
The flexibility of the reasonableness test of the validity of an indirect
restraint is similar to the flexibility of the reasonableness test of the
validity of a direct restraint as used in the minority rule and discussed
in note 7, supra.

56 A may fear that if the land is used for any other purpose the other

57

land which A owns may be damaged while its use for drainage may
improve his other property just as it will improve the property of
his neighbor, B. Thus, A who otherwise would not wish to sell the
property, will now sell it because he knows its use will not endanger
his other property.
A case where such a covenant was held void is discussed in 54 HARv.
L. REv. 1081 (1941). A covenant similar to this is where a housing
cooperative has a first option to buy the member's membership that
carries the privilege to use the property. A case where such a covenant
was held not to violate the rule against alienation is discussed in 14
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course, the court may decide that these provisions are unreasonable and declare them invalid, just as they would by using the
marketability test, but at least the court would be able to use a
more flexible standard of analysis which takes into consideration
various competing public policy issues.
At any rate, it becomes very difficult to deternine if a provision
is an indirect restraint on alienation under the Cast test due to
the vagaries of the marketability test. The court said the marketability test did not apply to conditions subsequent which did not
affect alienability. 58 However, it would seem that since a condition
subsequent places a requirement upon the holder, it will always
affect marketability to some exent. This may create a problem for
the court in later cases as it will have to determine when the
marketability has been adversely affected.
In conclusion, after determining that the beneficiary, Cast, had
received a fee simple from the will, the court could have resolved
the alienation issue in one of three ways. First, the court could
have said that the provision requiring twenty-five years occupancy
was in actuality a direct restraint and thus was void by virtue of the
Andrews rule. Second, it could have held the provisions constituted
indirect restraints, and then have declared them to be unreasonable
and thus void. Third, the court could have, and did, decide that the
provisions were indirect restraints because they affected the marketability of the property, and consequently indirect restraints upon
alienation are invalid regardless of reasonableness. By choosing the
third alternative the court is dangerously close to ruling that a
fee simple with any condition subsequent is invalid as it may restrain alienability indirectly by affecting the marketability of the
property. Essentially, the court has perhaps limited more strictly
than was intended, the power of a testator to dispose of his property.

58

Viumn. L. REv. 1535 (1961). Also a case in which a mortgage containing
a covenant not to sell the property is upheld as not being an invalid
restraint, is discussed in 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 954 (1965), supra note 6.
The court said, "we do not go so far as to say that all conditions
subsequent attached to a fee simple estate are void where alienability
is not involved." 186 Neb. at 391, 183 N.W.2d at 489.
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IV. SECURED INTERESTS

A. WAIVER OF SECURITY INTEREST
The basic issue presented in Garden City Production Credit
Association v. Lannan' was whether the secured party had, through
implied consent or authorization, waived its security interest in
certain collateral when it had prior knowledge of a sale of the
collateral, failed to object or require compliance with the express
terms of the agreement, and accepted and applied a portion of the
proceeds of the sale to the loan. The Nebraska Supreme Court
held that a secured party, having a security interest in farm
products that restricted the sale of the collateral without the prior
written consent of the secured party, retained a security interest
in the collateral purchased by an innocent purchaser notwithstanding the secured party's knowledge of the sale.
Doris and Murlin Carter executed a security agreement in Kansas
in favor of Garden City P.C.A. with regard to 161 head of cattle.
The security agreement which prohibited the Carters from encumbering, removing or otherwise disposing of the collateral without the written consent of the secured party2 was duly filed pursuant to the filing provisions of the Kansas Uniform Commercial
Code. Western Cattle Company, a cattle brokerage firm in Kansas,
negotiated a contract between the Carters and Augustin Brothers
of Shelby, Nebraska for sale of the cattle. Western issued a sight
draft on the Augustin account in a Columbus, Nebraska bank payable to Carter. Carter endorsed the draft, forwarded it to Garden
City P.C.A. as partial payment on his loan, and Garden City P.C.A.
accepted it as partial payment. The cattle were delivered to Augustin Brothers in Nebraska and a second sight draft was drawn on
their account. As before, Carter endorsed the draft and forwarded it
1 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1970).
2 Paragraph 7(5) of the security agreement

provided: "The Debtor will
care for and maintain the crops and property herein described in a
good and husbandlike manner and will not further encumber, conceal, remove, sell or otherwise dispose of the same without the written
consent of the Secured Party and, upon demand will provide additional collateral acceptable to the Secured Party." Brief for Appellee
at 8, Garden City P.C.A. v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 688, 186 N.W.2d 99

(1970) (emphasis added).
It should also be noted that the Carters, before the security agreement
involved in this case was executed, had sold collateral covered by
other security agreements without Garden City P.C.A.'s consent, had
endorsed all proceeds over to Garden City P.C.A. for application to
their loans, and had never been rebuked by Garden City P.C.A for
failing to secure prior written consent as was required under the
terms of the agreements.
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to Garden City P.C.A. Two weeks later Garden City P.C.A. was informed that the draft was being dishonored for insufficient funds.
After the sale Augustin Brothers sold the cattle to the defendant Lannan. Upon discovery that Lannan was in possession
of the cattle, Garden City P.C.A. filed a financing statement with
the county clerk of Platte County, Nebraska pursuant to the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code in order to perfect its security
in Nebraska. When demand was made on Lannan for the return
of the collateral, he refused and suit was filed demanding return of
the collateral. The district court found that because of its knowledge
of the proposed sale, its failure to object to the sale and its failure
to require compliance with the provisions of the agreement, Garden
City P.C.A. had waived its security interest in the cattle. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed.
The majority of the supreme court was of the opinion that the
Uniform Commercial Code was designed to furnish "standards
which would promote the necessity of and fluidity of farm credit
financing" and, at the same time, to "facilitate the sale and exchange of collateral by furnishing... a standard which purchasers
could rely on."14 Considering the purpose of the U.C.C., the realities
of financial transactions in the area of farm products, and the intent
of Garden City P.C.A. and the Carters in their course of dealings,
the court concluded that there was neither express nor implied
intent on the part of Garden City P.C.A. to waive the security
interest.
The rationale of the majority opinion may be stated as follows.
The U.C.C. provides in Section 9-306 (2)15 that a security interest
continues in collateral and all identifiable proceeds even after sale
of the collateral, unless there is authorization for the sale in the
security agreement or otherwise. Further, farm products are not
included in the exemptions the U.C.C. provides relative to the
termination of security interests. Section 9-307 (1) provides that
a buyer in ordinary course of business takes collateral free of a
security interest created by his seller; however, there is in this
section an exemption that does not include persons buying farm
3 Garden City P.C.A. v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 672, 186 N.W.2d 99,
102 (1970).
4

Id.

5 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) provides: "Except where this article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale,
exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action
was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise, and also continues in any indentifiable proceeds including
collections received by the debtor."
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products from a person engaged in farming operations. 6 Therefore,
since Augustin Brothers could not take the collateral free of a
security interest as a buyer in the ordinary course of business under
Section 9-307 (1), no one who purchased the cattle at a later point
in time could take the collateral free of a security interest. In
addition, the U.C.C. states in Section 1-205 (4)7 that when express
terms of an agreement cannot be construed consistently with a
course of dealing, the express terms control. Thus, Garden City
P.C.A. did not and could not waive its contractual right unless
that right was waived in writing.
In contrast, the dissent appears to disregard the applicability
of the farm products exemption of Section 9-307 (1) by pointing out
that the exemption has been severely criticized, that it is in a state
of demise and that it is contrary to the purpose of the U.C.C. in
that it severly restricts the free movement of farm products in
the stream of commerce. The dissent agreed with the majority that
the security interest followed the collateral into the defendant's
hands unless there was a waiver. The dissent, however, disagreed
with the majority's reasoning that the agreement provided for
written consent as a prerequisite to the waiver of the security
interest and, therefore, no other type of consent or waiver would be
possible. Judge Newton, the author of the dissenting opinion,
reached this conclusion by relying on Section 2-209 (4) 8 which pro6 U.C.C. § 9-307(1) provides: "A buyer in ordinary course of business
other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his
seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though
the buyer knows of its existence."
7 U.C.C. § 1-205(4) provides: "The express terms of an agreement and
an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such
construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of
dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of
trade."
8 U.C.C. § 2-209(1), (2), (3), (4) provides:
"(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this article needs no
consideration to be binding.
"(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or recinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement
on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed
by the other party.
"(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this article
(section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is
within its provisions.
"(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a
waiver."

618

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 4 (1972)

vides for modification or rescission even though the requirements
of subsections (2) and (3)-the necessity that modification or rescission be in writing-are not satisfied. The dissent concluded that
waiver was possible without prior written consent by virtue of Section 2-209 (4) and the comment to Section 9-306 (2). Therefore the
law of waiver was applicable to the Lannan case under the terms of
Section 1-103. 9 Applying the law of waiver, which states that a right
is deemed waived if a party knowingly acts contrary to such a right,
the conduct of Garden City P.C.A. evidenced a deliberate waiver.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that a security interest
continues in the collateral unless sale or other disposition of the
goods has been authorized by the security agreement or otherwise, 0
such as through a course of dealings." However, the U.C.C. protects the buyer in the ordinary course of business in order to allow
the establishment of inventory financing systems. Section 9-307 (1)
provides that a buyer in ordinary course, that is, one "who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in
ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind"'12 takes free of a security interest created by his seller.'3
However, Section 9-307 (1) will not allow a person buying farm
products' 4 from a person engaged in farming operations 1 5 to take
advantage of the "buyer in the ordinary course of business" exemption. Gilmore sees this as designed to "freeze the agricultural
mortgagee into the special status he has achieved under the preCode law."' 6
9 U.C.C. § 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions
of this act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent,
estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions."
10 U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
11 U.C.C. § 1-205(3) provides: "A course of dealing between the parties
and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are
engaged or of which they are or should be aware give particular
meaning to and supplement or qualify the terms of an agreement."
12 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
13 U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
'4 U.C.C. § 9-109(3), defines farm products within the meaning of the
code "if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in
farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their
unmanufactured states, and if they are in the possession of a debtor
engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations."

15 U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
16 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 26.11 (1965).
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In OverlandNational Bank v. Aurora Cooperative Elevator Co.17
the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted these provisions of the
U.C.C. as they relate to waiver and implied consent. In Overland
the security agreement gave the secured party a security interest
in all proceeds of the collateral, as well as the collateral itself.
The defendant, the innocent purchaser, argued that the provision
for a security interest in the proceeds established implied consent
for the debtor to sell the collateral, that the security interest would
be extinguished at the moment of sale and that therefore a secured
party had no recourse against an innocent third party purchaser.
The court rejected this theory and held that such a clause was "intended to protect a security holder as to third parties,
[and was]
8
not one of permission or consent to the borrower."'
Although the principles announced in Overland may be valid
in the factual situation which existed in that case, a different application of the law of waiver, Section 9-306 (2) and Section 9-307 (1)
is called for in Lannan because of the differences in the facts and the
course of dealings of the parties in the two cases. In Overland the
transactions between the two parties were quite limited; whereas in
Lannan there were numerous transactions over a period of years.
In Overland the secured party had no knowledge of the sale;
whereas in Lannan the secured party had knowledge of the sale
even before it occurred and yet failed to assert its contractual right
to require written consent before the sale was consummated. In
Overland none of the proceeds were applied to the debt; whereas
in Lannan all proceeds were assigned to the secured party, and the
secured party accepted them as partial payment of the loan. Such
striking differences in factual situations would certainly militate
against reliance on Overland as a criteria in determining whether
there was implied consent or waiver in Lannan. Coupling the above
differences with the fact that the court in Overland was only
concerned with the interpretation of a security interest in the pro17

18

184 Neb. 843, 172 N.W.2d 786 (1969). This case was decided after the
trial court had rendered its opinion in Lannan but before that case
went to the supreme court.
Id. at 846. The court in Vermillion Co. P.C.A. v. Izzard, 111 Ill. App.
2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (1969), in ruling on a security agreement which
gave the secured party a security interest in the proceeds, arrived at
the same conclusion as the court in Overland.
This approach seems to miss the point that if the secured party did
not wish the debtor to sell the collateral it would have included a
provision to that effect. The only logical inference that can be drawn
from a clause providing for a security interest in the proceeds is that
the secured party is not adverse to sale by the debtor and that it will
look only to the debtor for relief in the event of sale.
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ceeds as it related to implied consent and not with the past course
of dealings as they relate to waiver, which was the concern of the
court in Lannan, the use of Overland as precedent for the Lannan
decision seems tenuous.
Although virtually all cases involving the unauthorized sale of
farm products with security interests have been decided in favor
of the secured party,19 the case of Clovis National Bank v.
Thomas2° is contrary. In the Thomas case the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that a secured party's failure to rebuke a debtor for
past sales of collateral without prior written consent could give
rise to waiver and thereby cut off a secured party's right to recover
the collateral from a third party. The factual situation in Thomas
was similar to that in Lannan. In Thomas the borrower secured his
indebtedness by executing a security agreement with the plaintiff
which gave the plaintiff a security interest in cattle to be purchased.
The borrower later sold a number of cattle covered by the agreement and applied most of the proceeds to his loan. This was done
without rebuke from the plaintiff even though the agreement contained a clause prohibiting sale without prior consent on the part
of the secured party. The rest of the cattle were later consigned to
the defendant for sale at public auction. Unlike the plaintiff in
Lannan, the plaintiff in Thomas did not have actual knowledge of
the sale and none of the proceeds from this sale were applied to
the borrower's indebtedness.
The New Mexico court acknowledged that for a waiver to take
place there must be an abandonment or relinquishment of a known
right. Since the plaintiff had impliedly consented to prior sales
by collecting the proceeds without rebuking the debtor, the court
reasoned that such a course of dealings transcended the provisions
19 In addition to the cases cited in the text see United States v. Greenwich, 291 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Vermillion Co. P.C.A. v.
Izzard, 111 Ill. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (1969).
20 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967). Subsequent to the decision in this
case the New Mexico Legislature revised its version of Section
9-306(2) in order to make it impossible for another decision like
Thomas to be handed down by the New Mexico Supreme Court. N.M.
STAT. ANx. § 50A-9-306(2) (1971), now provides: "Except where this
article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any indentiflable proceeds including collections received by
the debtor. A security interest in farm products and the proceeds
thereof shall not be considered waived by the secured party by any
course of dealings between the parties or by any trade usage." (emphasis added).
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of the security agreement. Therefore, the secured party had no
recourse against a third party on the basis of the security agreement. Comparing this case with Lannan, waiver is more strongly
suggested in Lannan because of the secured party's actual knowledge of the sale.
The Lannan, Thomas and Overland decisions were mainly decided by applying Section 9-306(2) which has been deemed by
one court to either incorporate or codify the doctrine of waiver
into the "otherwise" clause.2 1 However, inherent in any consideration of security interests in farm products is the exemption of
farm products from the general provisions of Section 9-307 (1).
This exemption of persons buying farm products from persons
engaged in farming operations has caused a great deal of debate.
Numerous reasons have been set forth to defend the exemption.
One of the reasons is that only merchants are considered competent
to market their own products. To be a merchant demands a degree
of skill and knowledge in dealing with goods which a farmer is
presumed not to possess.22 Thus, to protect not only those who lend
farmers money but also the farmer, special provisions for farm
products are deemed necessary.2 It has been argued that a lender
needs added security when it comes to extending loans to farmers
because of the probability of a failure of a crop or the death of
the livestock. Consequently, to encourage the lending of money
to finance farming operations it is necessary to assure the lender
that he will receive added protection against the termination of
a security interest through sale to third parties. 24 Another reason
set forth is that in the area of farm products there is greater
difficulty in keeping track of the collateral due to commingling.2 5
By allowing a continuance of the security interest, policing of the
collateral on the part of the secured party is not necessary.
The validity of the reasons set forth for the farm products
exemption may be tested by applying them to other areas of ecoUnited States v. Greenwich, 291 F. Supp. 609, 614 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
47 TEXAS L. REV. 309, 311 (1969).
23 TCL
24 From conversations with banking and loan company officials in the
Lincoln, Nebraska area it appears that the existence of the exemption
in Section 9-307(1) does not enter into a determination of whether
a loan should be made to a farming operation. Considerations like
equity in land, community reputation, feasibility of the purpose of the
loan, conduct in past loan situations, etc., were the determining factors in the granting or rejecting of a loan, not the exemption of Section
9-307(1).
25 8 NAT. RES. J. 183 (1968).
21
22
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nomic endeavor. For example, in the consumer goods area a great
number of merchants clearly do not have adequate skill or knowledge to deal with their goods. In addition, there are many "shoestring" operations in consumer goods that would probably find
it easier to obtain financial assistance if an exemption, similar to
the farm products exemption of Section 9-307 (1), were applicable
to them. Moreover, a lender extending loans to a small retail merchant needs as much protection as the agricultural lender. The
basic reason such an exemption is not applied to consumer goods
is because it would severely impede the orderly flow of such goods
from the retailer to the consumer. If this is true, surely it can be
concluded that the effect of the exemption concerning farm products
is to indirectly impede the flow of agricultural products.
The nature of farming operations today, as contrasted to that
of pre-U.C.C. days, has radically changed. The farmer or rancher
is "no longer a sturdy yeoman. The farmer is a businessman, and
his inventory should be subject to the same rules as that of anyone
else."2 6 Although the latest proposed revision of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code retains the exemption, 27 there have
been strong arguments on the part of food processors 28 and various
authors that the exemption is unfair and should be eliminated.
This was the view of the committee charged with the task of revising Article 9.2 Their suggestion, however, has not been adopted
by the commissioners of the U.C.C.
The practical effect of the Lannan decision is to impose upon
all purchasers of farm products the onerous duty of searching
records and making detailed inquiries into the history of the
26
27
28

29

A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee, 26 Bus. LAw.
307, 314 (1970). This was a panel discussion.
REVIEw COMAMIT EE FOR ARTICLE 9 Or THE U.C.C. REPORT 101 (April 25,
1971).
The farm products exemption is especially vexatious to food processors. Does the security interest continue all the way to the grocery
shelves or does the status of a processor as a merchant place his goods
in the inventory catagory (see Section 9-109 (4) ) and thus free them
from the farm products exemption? It would appear that the farm
products exemption of Section 9-307(1) would not apply to manufactured farm products such as meat and cereal since Section
9-109(3) speaks of products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states. However, if a court determined that the security interest
did continue, interesting cases of priority of security agreements would
arise if there were also a security interest in the inventory of the food
processor.
Preliminary Report No. 2 of the Review Committee on Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Bus. LAw. 1069, 1081 (1970).
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products involved in the sale. Such a task would be monumental,
expensive and time consuming, especially in interstate transactions.
Also, many transactions involving the sale of farm products, for
example consignment sales, are consummated with such speed that
an adequate search of records in order to determine the existence
of a security interest would be virtually impossible. Because the
value of farm products is based on a fluctuating market, where time
is of the essence in order to effectuate an advantageous purchase,
to require a purchaser to search records would deny him the benefits of a proposed sale. In most situations, out of an economic necessity imposed upon him by the market, the purchaser probably
gambles that there is not a security interest involved in the goods
or, that if there is an unknown security interest, the debtor will
satisfy his debt by apply the proceeds of the sale to his loan. Thus
the purchaser of farm products, be he a farmer or dealer in such
goods, must either act irrationally in a legal sense or rationally in
a legal sense but irrationally in an economic sense.
A liberal application of the doctrine of waiver to cases such
as Lannan would somewhat alleviate the oppressive nature of the
farm products exemption of Section 9-307 (1), but such an application would not alleviate the oppressive operation of the exemption in the vast majority of cases that do not involve waiver but
do involve good faith purchases by innocent third parties. Nor would
such liberal application of waiver remove the burden the exemption
imposes on the free, orderly and unrestrained flow of agricultural
goods in the stream of commerce. The Lannan decision imposes an
inequitable burden on those dealing in farm products. The Thomas
decision, although equitable in spirit when compared to most cases
in this area, neither protects the vast number of purchasers affected
by the exemption nor fosters uniform application of the U.C.C.
The only logical approach to this problem is the removal of the
exemption from the U.C.C.
Abolition of the exemption would allow purchasers of farm
products, be they farmers or merchants, to purchase without continually worrying whether there is a security interest in the goods
that may later deprive them of the fruits of their purchase. Abolition would, to a degree, force lenders to more closely investigate
their customers. There is the possibility that removal of the exemption would result in greater difficulty in obtaining loans to finance
agricultural operations, at least until the "justifications" for the
exemption are proven to be unwarranted, if in fact lenders place
any weight whatsoever on the existence of the exemption in lending money to farming operations. It is this author's contention
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that the existence of the exemption has little or no effect on a
lender's willingness to loan money for farming operations and that
therefore the exemption's removal should not affect the availability
of loans or interest rates. 0
The necessity for removal of the exemption is clear. Alleviation
-from the exemption's operation in cases such as Launan, where
there has clearly been a waiver by the secured party, through the
application of the doctrines of waiver or implied consent cannot
be realized without consideration of Section 9-307 (1). Section 9307(1) is the law and cannot be summarily dismissed, as the dissent in Lanncn seemingly attempts to do. The most equitable
approach while the exemption exists would be to recognize that
Section 9-307 (1) confers upon a secured party in the area of farm
products a statutory right which allows for the continuance of the
security interest in agricultural products in the normal case where
there has been proper filing and proper conduct on the part of the
secured party with reference to the security agreement. However,
when the course of dealings between the secured party and the
debtor clearly evidences the relinquishment of a contractual right,
such as in Lamnan, the contract should be deemed modified, the
statutory right waived, and the law of waiver applied through
the "otherwise" clause of Section 9-306 (2) or through Section 1-103,
thereby allowing the debtor to do what the contract previously
forbade without jeopardizing the benefits of a third person's bargain
with him.
Applying this rationale to the Lannan factual situation, Garden
City P.C.A., by relinquishing, through its course of dealings, its
contractual right to prior written consent before the sale of the
collateral, would only be able to look to the debtor for payment.
Thus the harshness of the exemption of Section 9-307 (1) would
be avoided in the most blatant cases of waiver. The object of abolition of the exemption in 9-307 (1) would be to alleviate the exemption's harshness in the remaining farm products cases-that is,
cases not involving waiver but involving good faith purchases by
third parties-and to raise the farmer and his purchasers to the
same status in the marketplace as sellers and purchasers of other
consumer goods. All marketing, farm or otherwise, is based on
inventory financing. Under inventory financing both the lender and
the borrower want the products to be sold and operate on the assumption that they will be sold. Thus the inventory is expected to
be converted into proceeds and the proceeds used to pay off the loan.
30 See note 24 supra.
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To disrupt this type of financing operation, which the existence of
the exemption in 9-307(1) does, clearly impedes the free flow of
agricultural products in the stream of commerce. As agriculture
becomes more and more corporate in nature, the need for a uniform
standard that all segments of the economic community can rely on
becomes necessary. Although the eventual solution to the problem
in this area lies with the legislature, the court in Lannan clearly
missed an opportunity to afford relief when it was presented with a
clear case of waiver.
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V. TORTS

A.

STRICT LIABILITY

In Kohler v. Ford Motor Co.' the Nebraska Supreme Court
adopted strict liability in tort. A manufacturer is now strictly liable
in tort if an article he has placed on the market, knowing it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to be defective, and2
the defect causes injury to one who is rightfully using the product.
Although there were five issues to which the court had to address
itself,3 this note will only concern itself with adoption of strict
liability in tort.
In her original petition the appellee, Janet J. Kohler, had alleged
four causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) negligence in failing to
warn the purchasers; (3) breach of express warranty; and (4)
breach of implied warranty. 4 In an amended petition filed after the
statute of limitations had run Miss Kohler alleged: (1) res ipsa
loquitur; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of implied
warranty; and (4) strict liability. The appellant, Ford Motor Co.,
1 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
2 Id. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 606.
3 1. Did the trial court err in overruling a special appearance by the defendant?
2. Was the cause barred by the statute of limitations because the
amended petition, filed after the statute had run, presented for the
first time the "strict liability" theory?
3. Should the doctrine of strict liability in tort be adopted and held
applicable under the facts of this case?
4. If strict liability in tort is to be adopted in the state of Nebraska
was the evidence sufficient to submit to the jury the issues of
whether the defect was in existence when the car left the defendant's hands and whether the defect was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries?
5. Did the trial court err in permitting the plaintiff to introduce the
testimony of a certain expert witness on rebuttal?
4 Brief for the Appellants at 43, Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb.
428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
5 Id. Ford Motor Co. contended that the addition of "strict liability"
in the amended petition constituted a new cause of action and that
since the statute of limitations had run Miss Kohler was barred from
alleging strict liability. The court did not share this view. To the
court the general facts upon which the right to recover was based
were the same as those needed to prove plaintiff's theories in the
original petition. Therefore, the theory of strict liability related back
to the original petition. This would not have been possible had the
court not previously changed its interpretation of the relation-back
rule in Abbott v. Abbott, 185 Neb. 177, 174 N.W.2d 335 (1970). The
previous view was that an amendment that introduced a new theory

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
appealed as error the lower court's decision to submit the case to
the jury on the theory of strict liability in tort.
The automobile in which Miss Kohler sustained her injuries was
driven by Lois F. Poppee who was killed in the accident. There was
no eyewitness testimony as to what caused the automobile to leave
the highway. Miss Kohler testified that the automobile began vibrating and then swerved to the left-hand side of the road and
into the ditch. The automobile operated by Miss Poppee had passed
an automobile operated by Geraldine Licht who testified that after
the Poppee automobile returned to its own lane "the rear end
of the car wobbled like an empty pickup." 6 Mrs. Licht also testified
that shortly thereafter the Poppee automobile "wobbled toward
the left of the highway, back to the right, and then into the left
ditch.' 7 Mr. Licht's testimony was substantially the same.
Shortly after the accident, agents of Ford Motor Co. dismantled
the steering mechanism of the automobile and opened the housing
containing the sector gear. It was discovered that one of the teeth
of the sector gear was broken and when the grease was removed
from the housing two fragments of the broken tooth came out with
the grease. Expert testimony revealed that during tests on the sector
gear of the automobile involved in the accident, parts of the gear
gave way before the teeth of the gear could be damaged, indicating
defective construction. 8 Although there was testimony that the
tooth of the gear broke as a result of the impact of the accident, the
court was of the opinion that in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence "it [the evidence] must be considered most favorably to
the successful party and every controverted fact resolved in his
favor, and he must have the benefit of inferences reasonably deducible from it." 9 Thus the Nebraska Supreme Court held that:
[A] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he placed
in the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect which causes an injury to a human
of recovery constituted a new cause of action. Thus, under the prior
rule, if the statute of limitations had run, the new theory was barred
since the statute of limitations ran until the filing of the amendment.
See also 50 NEB. L. REV. 509 (1971).
6 187 Neb. at 433, 191 N.W.2d at 605.
7 ld
8 Other tests were conducted in which a tooth of a sector gear identical
to the one in the Poppee's automobile was broken and then replaced
using an adhesive. The steering gear was then turned until the tooth
dropped into the gear box. When the automobile was driven the
steering gear locked and the car left the highway.
9 187 Neb. at 438-39, 191 N.W.2d at 608.
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being rightfully using that product. The effort of the manufacturer
to limit its liability by rules applying to warranties is not effective
here.10

The judges who dissented did not object to the majority's adoption of strict liability in tort, but they did object to the majority's
determination that the evidence presented by Miss Kohler was sufficient to sustain the lower court's finding that the defect was the
cause of the accident. Judge Boslaugh was of the opinion that the
evidence was totally circumstantial and as such was "not sufficient
to sustain a judgment unless the circumstances proved are of such
a nature and so related to each other that the conclusion reached
is the only one that fairly and reasonably can be drawn therefrom."'1 Since the cause of the accident was not definitely known,
Miss Kohler had the burden of proving that the accident was caused
by the defect, and in Judge Boslaugh's opinion the facts went no
12
further than to give equal support to two inconsistent inferences.
Thus the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the finding based on
one of the inferences. Judge Smith was also of the opinion that the
circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to sustain the finding.
Judge Newton felt that even if all Miss Kohler's contentions were
accepted, "the sole proximate cause of the accident was the failure
to apply the brakes and stop,"'13 since there was evidence that Miss
Poppee could have stopped in time.
1. History of Products Liability
The history of the law of products liability, culminating in the
doctrine of strict liability in tort as set forth by the court in
Kohler, began with the case of Winterbottom v. Wright. 4 In denying recovery on the ground of lack of privity of contract, the
court established a rule that was to perplex courts and confuse the
law in the area of products liability until the 1960's. The court in
Winterbottom was of the opinion that:
[I]f the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach,
might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of
such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see not limit
would ensue.15
10 Id. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 606.
11 Id. at 441, 191 N.W.2d at 609.
12 See id. at 445, 191 N.W.2d at 611.
13 Id. at 446, 191 N.W.2d at 612.
'4 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
15 Id. at 405.
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Winterbottom developed the general rule that unless there was
privity of contract there could be no liability. However, the allencompassing nature of the general rule was slowly eroded by judicial recognition of certain exceptions. In 1903 the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit enumerated the execptions that had developed since the decision in Winterbottom. The first exception included products known to be "imminently" dangerous, unless the
manufacturer disclosed the danger to the buyer. Secondly, an exception existed where, irrespective of a contract, a defendant furnished a defective product on his premises for a plaintiff-invitee
to use. The third exception operated where the defendant was negligent in the manufacture or sale of an "imminently" dangerous
product intended to perserve, destroy or affect human life (e.g.,
food, beverages, firearms, explosives).16
Further, in MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.17 the privity rule was
diluted by creating a large class of cases where the rule was not
applied. In MacPhersonthe plaintiff purchased an automobile from
a retailer. The automobile collapsed due to a defective wheel, and
the plaintiff was injured. The court recognized that an automobile
was not inherently dangerous and therefore could not fall within
one of the generally recognized execptions. In contrast, the court
held that "if the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then a thing of danger,"'' 8 and the manufacturer is liable. 9 Following the decision in MacPherson the liability of manufacturers was
slowly extended to cover more products and situations, but the barrier of privity was an ever-present factor to be considered when
attempting to hold a manufacturer liable.
On May 9, 1960 the "citadel of privity" fell.2 ° On that day a New
Jersey court decided Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Co. 21 In Henningsen the plaintiff's husband bought a car from the defendant16 Huset v. J. I. Case Threashing Co., 120 F. 865, 870-71 (8th Cir.
1903). The first exception is represented by Landridge v. Levy, 150
Eng. Rep. 863 (1937); the second exception by Coughtry v. Globe
Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124 (1874); and the third execption by Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
17 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
IsId. at 1053.
19 Professor Prosser says that the effect of MacPherson was to place all
products, if imperfectly made, within the inherently dangerous exception. W. PRossER, HAxDBOOK o Tr LAw OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed.
1971).
20 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Atn=. L. REv. 791 (1966).
21 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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retailer under a sales contract which contained disclaimers of all
express and implied warranties. While the plaintiff, whom the defendant claimed lacked privity because she was not a party to the
purchase contract, was driving the car there was a loud sound from
beneath the car, whereupon the steering wheel spun from her
hands, the car veered sharply to the right and crashed into a brick
22
wall.
The Henningsen court examined modern marketing conditions
and came to the conclusion that "when a manufacturer puts a new
automobile into the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by
the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for
use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate consumer." 3 The court criticized the extent to which the privity
barrier barred recovery by pointing out that the ordinary buyer
of products does not buy them for his exclusive use and that manufacturers are well aware of this fact and market their products on
that assumption. The court concluded that Mrs. Henningsen was a
person who "in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the
warranty, might be expected to become a user of the automobile.
Her lack of privity does not stand in the way of prosecution of the
injury suit ....2Henningsen was soon followed by the California decision of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.25 in which the court imposed strict liability in tort. In Greenman the plaintiff's wife bought
her husband a combination power tool. While operating the power
tool a piece of wood flew out of the machine, due to a defective
set-screw, and struck the plaintiff on the forehead. Disregarding all
concepts of warranty the court held that a "manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being. ''26 The court said:
The purpose of such liability [strict liability in tort] is to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
22

It should be noted that the automobile involved in Henningsen was
so badly damaged that it was impossible to determine whether there
had been a defect in the steering mechanism.

23

32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960).
Id. at 413, 161 A.2d at 100.
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.

24

25
26
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than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect them27
selves.
2. Products Liability Cases in Nebraska
While Nebraska law does not abound with cases involving the
liability of a manufacturer or vendor for physical injury relulting
from the use of a product by a consumer,28 a number of cases should
be noted. In 1933 the Nebraska Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Tegler v. Farmer's Union Gas & Oil Co.29 Although the
court denied recovery for the death of a child caused by an explosion which occurred when the mother was filling an incubator
lamp with kerosene, the court did adopt the rule of MacPherson.
The court was of the opinion that a manufacturer or vendor was
responsible to the ultimate consumer for putting inherently dangerous articles on the market without adequate warning. However,
the court found that kerosene was not inherently dangerous if it
met statutory "flash" tests and was handled with care. Since the
manufacturer in this case had used the requisite amount of care
that an ordinary prudent person would have exercised by "flash"
testing the kerosene, and there was no evidence that the kerosene
had become more volatile or contaminated while in the manufacturer's hands, recovery was denied.

27

28

29

Id. at 63. 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The doctrine set forth
in Greenman was later incorporated into RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965). That section provides:
"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller."
For cases in the area of products liability that did not involve physical
injury to human beings but where the manufacturer was held liable
for his defective product see Rose v. Buffalo Air Service, 170 Neb. 806,
104 N.W. 2d 431 (1960); Brown v. Globe Laboratories, 165 Neb. 138,
84 N.W. 2d 151 (1957); Colvin v. John Powell Co., 163 Neb. 112,
77 N.W .2d 900 (1956); Cox v. Greenlease-Liep Motor, 134 Neb. 1, 277
NW. 819 (1938).
124 Neb. 337, 246 N.W. 721 (1933).
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In 1956 the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled on a vendor's liability
for injuries resulting from consumption of defective food.30 The
plaintiff was eating sherbet at the defendant's establishment when
she was injured by a piece of concealed glass in the sherbet. In
holding that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the issue of
implied warranty to the jury, the court adopted the rule:
[O]ne engaged in the business of serving food for immediate consumption on the premises impliedly warrants that the food is
wholesome and fit for human consumption, and is liable, upon
breach of such warranty, without proof 3 of negligence, to a consumer injured by eating deleterious food. '
In 1961 the court decided Asher v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 32 The
plaintiff entered a cafe and ordered a soft drink. The bottle was
uncapped and served with a straw. After drinking most of the bottle's contents through the straw he began drinking out of the bottle.
He swallowed some substance, looked at the bottle and discovered
the remnants of a mouse. The court held: [Privity is] no longer an
element to be established in an action upon an implied warranty
that food products are wholesome and fit for public consumption
where they are shown to be in the same condition as when they left
33
the control of the manufacturer.
3. Strict Liability
As the above history demonstrates, courts have imposed strict
liability in the area of products liability under two theories-strict
liability in tort and strict warranty liability. The basic rationale
behind the imposition of strict warranty liability "is the prevention
of frustration of his [the purchaser's] expectations about the characteristics and quality of products purchased." 34 Thus, the focus is
upon whether the goods conform to any express representations 35
Zorinsky v. American Legion Post No. 1, 163 Neb. 213, 79 N.W.2d
172 (1956).
31 Id. at 220, 79 N.W.2d at 176.
32 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961).
33 Id. at 860, 112 N.W.2d at 255.
34 Keeton, Products Liability, 50 F.R.D. 338, 340 (1970).
35 Under § 2-313, express warranties are created by any affirmation of
fact or promise made by a seller which related to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain, any description of the goods
which is made part of the basis of the bargain, or any sample or model
which is made part of the basis of the bargain. Under this section it
is not necessary that the seller use formal words such as "warrant"
to create an express warranty. However, "puffing" language used by
the seller during negotiations for the sale of particular goods does not
constitute the creation of an express warranty.
30
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made by the seller, and to any implied warranties of merchantabil-

ity"86 or "fitness for a particular purpose."8 7 Liability results from
failure to meet the contract's terms, whether express or implied.

Strict liability in tort, on the other hand, emphasizes the defective character of the product when it left the manufacturer's hands
and seeks to shift the burden of the loss from the consumer to the
manufacturer who placed the defective product in the stream of
commerce. Under strict liability in tort, all express or implied contractual representations are disregarded. Strict liability in tort requires only that the product caused an injury, that the injury was
a result of the defect in the product, and that the defect was in
existence when the product left the manufacturer's hands.88
Although strict liability in tort has as a central aim risk distribution and relies almost exclusively upon it for its justification, the
warranty approach reaches a like result in that it too shifts the
loss from the consumer to one who is better able to absorb the burden, namely the seller. He in turn is able to broadly distribute the
loss to his insurer or the general public.
The two theories are functionally alike insofar as they both serve
to distribute the loss broadly throughout society. However, application of one of the approaches rather than the other will produce
varying results. The warranty approach permits recovery not only
for physical injury but also for economic loss.39 Under the U.C.C.,
a seller may disclaim all warranties 40 provided the disclaimer is
36 Under § 2-314 "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is

implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to the goods of that kind." Goods to be merchantable must be
at least such as "pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description," are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used," or "conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on
the container or label if any."
37 Under § 2-315 "[w]here the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for such purpose."
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See note 27, supra.
39 Unlike § 402A, the U.C.C. provides for incidental and consequential
damages for breach. Section 2-715 deliniates what incidental and consequential damages include.
40 U.C.C. § 2-316.
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conspicuous 4' and not unconscionable; 42 under strict liability in tort,
any attempted disclaimer is always ineffective. Under the U.C.C.,
a consumer must give the manufacturer notice of the breach within
a "reasonable" period of time; 43 under strict liability in tort, notice
is not required. Under Section 2-725 (2) of the U.C.C.,4 the cause
of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run upon
tender of delivery, irrespective of knowledge of the breach; in tort,
of the cause of action begins when the tort has been committed, that
is, when the injury is sustained.45
While it is clear that the court in Kohler adopted strict liability
in tort, the court's citation of three cases leads to analytical confusion. The Henningsen decision, relied upon in Kohler, held a manufacturer liable for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. In contrast, Greenman,also relied upon in Kohler, was based
on strict liability in tort. To equate Henningsen and Greenman for
the proposition that lack of privity under the circumstances of those
cases is no problem is correct; but to equate the two cases as standing for the proposition of strict liability in tort is clearly incorrect.
The court's use of Asher v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 46 is also analytically confusing. The food and beverage cases, such as Asher,
were an exception to the privity requirement established in Winterbottom as a necessary prerequisite to recovery under a warranty
theory. Although some of the food and beverage cases have turned
on the manufacturer's negligence, the Asher case was an implied
warranty action and the court's decision was supported by cases
decided under the Uniform Sales Act.
41 Under § 2-316 in order to exclude or modify implied warranties of

merchantability the language must mention merchantability and in
the case of a writing must be conspicuous. To exclude or modify an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose the exclusion
must be made by a writing and it too must be conspicuous.

42

U.C.C. § 2-302.

43

What constitutes reasonable time has not been made clear by judicial
decisions. Some courts say that notice of suit is within the reasonable
time limit and other courts have looked to the facts of the case to
determine a reasonable time period. The parties may, in their contract,
agree as to what is a reasonable time period in which to give notice
of breach and this is what most contracts for sale now do.
§ 2-725(2) provides: "A cause of action accrues when the breach
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is

44

made. .. ."
45 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-207 (Reissue 1964).
46 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961).
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The Kohler court's statement that there is "no rational distinction
tion bewteen the soft drink cases and the case at hand"47 is not entirely correct. They are alike in that for liability to be imposed the
barrier of privity had to be surmounted; however, the method used
can be important. Adoption of strict liability in tort is a simple
method of avoiding privity questions completely. Under a warranty
approach the extent of the warranty's protective
umbrella may still
48
be a problem to be confronted in each case.
Although strict liability in tort has been judicially adopted in
numerous states,4 9 this development has not met with universal
praise.50 The major criticism is that judicial adoption of strict liabil47

187 Neb. at 435, 191 N.W.2d at 606 (1971).

48 States adopting the Uniform Commercial Code had, depending on

when they adopted it, various alternatives open to them in adopting
Section 2-318 of the Code:
"Alternative A-A seller's warranty whether express or implied
extends to any natural person who is in the family or household
of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
"Alternative B-A seller's warranty whether express or implied

extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use,
to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section."
"Alternative C-A seller's warranty whether express or implied
extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach
of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section with respect to injury tQ the person of an individual
to whom the warranty extends."
These alternatives were drafted at different times and reflect the
U.C.C.'s attempt to keep up with the rapid developments in the area
of products liability. It should be noted that Nebraska adopted Alternative A.
49 According to 1 CCH PRoDucTs LiAnnn= REP., 4070, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nebraska,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
and Wisconsin have adopted strict liability in tort. The Federal courts
of Colorado, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont have anticipated acceptance. The Indiana appellate court has also anticipated
acceptance. Michigan and New York have inferentially accepted the
doctrine.
50 See, Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966);
Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contracts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
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ity in tort is "judicial creation of a common law doctrine of products
liability which bypasses a recently enacted body of statutory law
concerned with substantially the same field.""' The criticism of
judicial encroachment on the legislature's domain has substance
if one views the legislature's adoption of the U.C.C. as a determination of the extent to which strict liability was to be imposed on
sellers of goods. One might argue that when the legislature adopted
the U.C.C. it meant to preempt the field for all matters falling
within the terms of that legislation. This argument loses much of
its vitality when one remembers that the U.C.C. was drafted and
adopted by many states prior to the explosion of products liability
cases of the 1960's and the subsequent drafting of Section 402A of
the Restatement of Torts. The adoption of strict liability in tort
should, however, not be looked upon as judicial usurpation but as
supplementary law designed to afford relief and avoid inequity
52
when application of the U.C.C. would clearly result in inequity.
Absolving a manufacturer of strict liability for defective products
may have made economic sense when American industry was in a
state of infancy and in need of protection. Today, however, because
the bulk of American industry can absorb and spread the loss with
less hardship than the individual who has been injured, the risk
of bearing the loss caused by defective products should be reallocated. Viewed in this manner the Kohler court's adoption of strict
liability in tort might be said to be commendable. However, the
L. REV. 692 (1965); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713
(1970).
51 Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
RuTGERS L. REv.692, 712 (1965).
52 In considering the scope of strict liability in tort and the warranty
provisions of the U.C.C. and the argument of judicial usurpation the
case of Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965)
should be noted. Chief Justice Traynor, in the majority opinion stated
that the doctrine of strict liability in tort was not designed to supersede the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. adopted by the legislature but was designed to govern the distinct problem of physical
injuries. Justice Traynor was of the opinion that the rules of warranty
functioned well in commercial settings but frustrated rational compensation for physical injury. The court seemed to say that the scope of
the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. are designed to cover commercial transactions and that the law of warranty is primarily aimed
at controlling the commercial aspects of these transactions. Strict
liability in tort, in Traynor's view, supplements the U.C.C. by providing a means of recovery for physical injury when the application
of the U.C.C.'s warranty provisions would not adequately handle
the matter, or when the matter fell outside the pale of the U.C.C.
RUTGERS
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Kohler court's failure to carefully select the cases designed to support its proposition may very well lead to problems in future cases.
Because the court mixes warranty cases and strict liability in tort
cases together in reaching its decision, the point at which either
approach ends and the other begins or how the court views each
approach's role in the area of products liability is left confused
and will cause perplexing problems for the Nebraska courts in the
future.5
53

It will be interesting to see how Nebraska courts apply strict liability
in tort in areas which other jurisdictions have had problems, e.g.,
design, drugs, component parts, and blood banks. These problem
areas will undoubtedly come before the court in the near future, and
the author suggests that the Nebraska courts will follow the lead
of other jurisdictions by creating exceptions to the general rule in
order to relieve parties from the harshness of the general rule's effect,
in much the same manner as the courts created exceptions after the
decision in Winterbottom.

